Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1993

Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection
Nancy J. King

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law and Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in
Jury Selection, 68 New York University Law Review. 707 (1993)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/784

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Tue Nov 1 15:24:13 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707 (1993).
ALWD 7th ed.
Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707 (1993).
APA 7th ed.
King, N. J. (1993). Racial jurymandering: cancer or cure--a contemporary review of
affirmative action in jury selection. New York University Law Review, 68(4), 707-776.
Chicago 17th ed.
Nancy J. King, "Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection," New York University Law Review 68, no. 4
(October 1993): 707-776
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Nancy J. King, "Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection" (1993) 68:4 NYU L Rev 707.
AGLC 4th ed.
Nancy J. King, 'Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection' (1993) 68(4) New York University Law Review 707
MLA 9th ed.
King, Nancy J. "Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection." New York University Law Review, vol. 68, no.
4, October 1993, pp. 707-776. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Nancy J. King, 'Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure--A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection' (1993) 68 NYU L Rev 707
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

68

OCTOBER

1993

NUMBER

4

RACIAL JURYMANDERING*: CANCER
OR CURE? A CONTEMPORARY REVIEW
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN JURY SELECTION
NANCY

J.

KJNG**

Racialandethnic minorities continue to be substantiallyunderrepresentedon criminal
jurie. At all stages ofjury selection-venue choice, source list development, qualified
list development, andjury panel andforeperson selection-traditionalmethods of selection exclude a disproportionatenumber of minorities. In response, a growing
number ofjurisdictionsare employing race-consciousproceduresto ensure that minorities are represented in juries andjury pools in proportions that equal or exceed their
percentagesin local communities. At the same time, the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements on affirmative action andstanding suggest that these reforms may be
short-lived. Professor King suggests that the Court's current strict scrutiny standard
can and should accommodate limited uses of racial classifications in jury selection.
Specifically, ProfessorKing contends that racially representativejuries are essential to
the appearanceoffairness in criminaljury proceedings, and that maximizing the appearanceof legitimacy isa compelling governmental interest She claims that not all
types of jurymanderingfurther this interest, however, and proposes several features
with which to distinguish measureswhich are likely to improve public confidence in the
impartiality of the system from measures that are not likely to have this effect.
* The term "jurymandering" was coined by Jeffrey Rosen. See Jeffrey Rosen, Jurymandering, New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15. I do not use it in a pejorative sense. See T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional
Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 588 (1993) (noting derivation of term
"gerrymander").
** Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. My thanks to G. Thomas Munsterman of the National Center for State Courts and the many court administrators, judges,
legislators, and state's attorneys around the country who responded to my inquiries, to the
members of the Summoning and Qualification Subcommittee of The Jury Project in New York
State, to all of those who offered their comments on this project, including Albert Alschuler,
Robert Belton, James Blumstein, Anne Coughlin, Barry Friedman, Robert Rasmussen, and
Nicholas Zeppos, and John Garvey and other participants in the University of Kentucky Randall-Park Faculty Colloquium. Lauren Degnan, Roger Martella, and Sandra Wilkinson provided able research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Practically unnoticed, a growing number of courts are using race to
select jurors. The race-based selection procedures they use are unlike
efforts in the past, now denounced, that deliberately limited the opportu-

nities of African Americans and members of other racial or ethnic minorities to serve on juries. Instead, courts that consider race when selecting
juries today often pursue a different goal: to increase the representation
of minorities on juries or in jury pools to levels that duplicate or surpass
their percentages in local populations. Motivated by continuing defense
challenges1 and negative public reaction to juries and jury pools that fail
1 Racial underrepresentation in jury source lists, venires, and grand juries still generates
lengthy court battles, frequently in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Defendants continue to
claim that procedures which produce a low proportion of minority jurors in their juries or jury
pools amount to intentional discrimination or violate the sixth amendment guarantee to a jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365
n.23, 368 (1979) (noting that "the fair-cross-section requirement involves a comparison of the
makeup of jury venires or other sources from which jurors are drawn with the makeup of the
community" and that once defendant shows underrepresentation, state bears burden of showing that "attainment of a fair cross section" would be "incompatible with a significant state
interest"). Recent challenges to underrepresentation include Floyd v. Garrison, 996 F.2d 947,
949 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving sixth amendment challenge to underrepresentation of African
Americans in venire); United States v. Womack, 985 F.2d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 1993) (same);
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (involving equal protection
challenge to grand jury selection), postconviction relief denied, 990 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993); Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1992) (involving equal protection challenge to discrimination in selection of grand jury foreperson), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993); Harris v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 806 F. Supp. 627,
640 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (involving equal protection challenge to grand jury selection), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3069 (1993); Rutherford v. State, 612 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992) (involving equal protection challenge to discrimination in selection of grand jury
foreperson); Burleson v. Daphne, 599 So. 2d 1251, 1251 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (involving
sixth amendment challenge to underrepresentation of African Americans in venire); People v.
Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 180 (Colo. 1993) (involving equal protection challenge to underrepresentation of persons with Spanish surnames on venire); State v. Thomas, 609 So. 2d 1078,
1080 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (involving equal protection challenge to discrimination in selection of
grand jury forepersons); State v. Jefferies, 428 S.E.2d 150, 152 (N.C. 1993) (same); State v.
Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 193 (Tenn. 1992) (involving equal protection challenge to underrepresentation of African Americans in venire), cert. denied, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 402; Cantu v.
State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 678 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1992) (involving equal protection challenge to
underrepresentation of Hispanics and African Americans on grand jury), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 3046 (1993). For an analysis of the standards courts use to review such claims, see generally Nancy J. King, Post Conviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1993).
A number of these defense challenges succeed and result in retrials or resentencings. See,
e.g., Jefferson v. Morgan, 962 F.2d 1185, 1187 (6th Cir.) (upholding equal protection challenge
to underrepresentation of African Americans on grand juries), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 297
(1992); Johnson v. Puckett, 929 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that discrimination
in selection of grand jury foreperson violated equal protection clause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
274 (1992); Hollis v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that systematic
exclusion of African Americans from grand and trial juries violated equal protection clause),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1478 (1992); United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 968 (D. Conn.
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to reflect the racial diversity of their communities, 2 lawmakers and court
administrators are turning to fixed percentages-what some would term
racial quotas-to guarantee minority or ethnic representation in jury dis3
trict populations, juror lists, venires, and juries themselves.
At the same time that the social and litigation costs of unrepresentative juries have prompted lawmakers to consider race-conscious methods
of ensuring representation, the United States Supreme Court's decisions
on standing have made it easier for criminal defendants and civil litigants
to challenge such practices, 4 and its equal protection decisions have made
those challenges more likely to succeed. In particular, the novel theory
of equal protection injury that the Court adopted this past term in Shaw
v. Reno, 5 together with the uncompromising standards for reviewing
race-based affirmative action efforts established by City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson, Co. ,6 threaten every one of these recent race-conscious jury
selection measures.
In this Article, I examine these initiatives, their purposes, and their
vulnerability under Shaw and Croson.7 The most interesting conflict be1992) (finding equal protection and sixth amendment violations due to underrepresentation of
racial and ethnic minorities on qualified wheel); James v. Whitley, No. CIV.A. 91-998-A, Magistrate Judge's Report at 20 (M.D. La. Oct. 27, 1992) (holding that discrimination in selection
of grand jury foreperson violated equal protection clause); Lee v. Alabama, 1993 Ala. LEXIS
238, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 1993) (finding that discrimination in selection of grand
jury violated equal protection clause); Flores v. State, 783 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (finding that underrepresentation of Americans of Mexican descent on grand juries violated equal protection clause).
2 See Charles L. Lindner, Riots as a Response to the Law, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 15
(describing several violent reactions); notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra (discussing
public response to perceived unfairness of racially unrepresentative juries).
3 See, e.g., Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of Georgia, Jury Commissioner's Handbook 23 (5th printing 1992) [hereinafter Georgia Handbook] (noting that
"balancing the box" "may help to reduce the time spent by the state defending challenges to
the array, since in the last few years many of the challenges filed have asserted this ground");
Citizens Panel on Minority Jurors, Report Submitted to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court
of Kalamazoo County 5 (Feb. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Kalamazoo Report] (stating that although
underrepresentation had been observed for some time, it was not until after first Rodney King
verdict and its aftermath that judges "resolved to pursue the matter more vigorously").
4 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1993) (holding that in order for plaintiff to challenge
minority set-aside program, it need only show "denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit"); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992) (holding that veniremember's equal protection rights are
violated when criminal defendant exercises peremptory strikes on basis of race and recognizing
prosecutor's standing to raise those rights); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding
that white defendant has standing to raise equal protection claim of African-American
veniremembers excluded by prosecutor's race-based peremptories).
5 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
6 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
7 The Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitutionality of more recent raceconscious jury selection reforms and has reviewed a similar practice purportedly intended to
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tween the Court and proponents of these affirmative action efforts involves a dispute over how race-based jury selection affects public
attitudes toward the justice system. The sponsors of race-conscious selection procedures believe that minority underrepresentation on juries exachieve proportional representation only once, more than 40 years ago. See text accompanying notes 86-88 infra. Only a handful of reported cases, press reports, and opinion pieces have
addressed recent race-conscious selection initiatives. See Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993); Meders v. State, 389 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1990);
State v. Moore, 404 S.E.2d 845 (N.C. 1991); Marla Dickerson, What Color Is a Jury of One's
Peers?, Detroit News, May 23, 1993, at B1; Andrew Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by CrossSection, New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17; David Margolick, As Venues Are Changed,
Many Ask How Important a Role Race Should Play, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1992, at 7; Roger
S. Worthington, Should Justice Peek? Police Trials Raise Questions About Juries' Makeup,
Chi. Trib., Aug. 29, 1993, at Cl.
Legal commentators have not yet canvassed or evaluated these developments. One sampling of opinions on the subject reveals little agreement. Before officials in Hennepin County,
Minnesota adopted their plan for reserving two of 23 seats on every capital grand jury for
nonwhites, see text accompanying notes 67-68 infra, they solicited letter opinions from several
well-known constitutional scholars. Three of the five professors responding assumed that the
county's proposal would be subject to strict scrutiny if challenged, and all doubted that the
proposal would withstand such scrutiny if challenged. See Letter from Albert Alschuler, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, to Michael 0. Freeman, County Attorney,
Office of the Hennepin County Attorney (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file with the New York University
Law Review) (arguing that proposal ought to survive strict scrutiny but probably would not,
given the views of the current Court); Letter from Daniel Farber, Professor of Law, University
of Minnesota Law School, to Carl Warren, Associate Clinical Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (Oct. 8, 1991) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting
that strict scrutiny would apply); Letter from Fred L. Morrison, Professor of Law, University
of Minnesota Law School, to Louis N. Smith, Deputy County Attorney, Office of the Hennepin County Attorney (Oct. 8, 1991) (on file with the New York University Law Review)
(same). The other two commentators suggested that the proposal would be upheld under a
lower level of scrutiny. See Letter from Roy Brooks, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego School of Law, to Michael 0. Freeman, County Attorney, Office of the Hennepin
County Attorney (Oct. 21, 1991) (on file with the New York University Law Review); Letter
from Sheri Lynn Johnson, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, to Michael 0. Freeman,
County Attorney, Office of the Hennepin County Attorney (Oct. 22, 1991) (on file with the
New York University Law Review); see also Randolph F. Treece et al., Capital District Black
Bar Association, How Far Have We Come Since the Magna Carta: Jury of One's Peers, Jury
Panels, Minorities, and the Third and Fourth Judicial Districts 47-54 (1993) (suggesting that
some race-conscious measures would be constitutional).
Judicial consideration of the racial demographics of jury districts before changing trial
venues, described in text accompanying notes 39-44 infra, has received some recent attention
in law reviews. See generally M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional
Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1855
(1993); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1533 (1993); Note, Out of the Frying Pan or Into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue
After Rodney King, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1993) [hereinafter Out of the Frying Pan]. Scholars have periodically debated the merits of racial quotas on trial juries, see note 74 infra; none
has considered such proposals since the Court in Croson and Shaw hardened its position on the
use of racial classifications to enhance minority opportunity. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611 (1985) (proposing equal protection
remedy to jury bias); Harold MacDougall, Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 Yale L.J. 531,
537 (1970) (proposing proportional representation scheme for petit juries).
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acerbates the suspicion and alienation that many people feel toward
criminal proceedings, and that more inclusive selection procedures, even
if they require classifying prospective jurors by race, are necessary to prevent further deterioration of public respect for the jury system. The
Justices who joined the Court's majority opinion in Shaw, on the other
hand, appear to have an entirely different understanding. In their view,
any use of racial classifications to construct a decisionmaking body cannot improve the appearance of fairness of its proceedings and decisions
but can only further promote racial divisiveness and distrust.
In this Article, I seek to reconcile these opposing positions by proposing a framework for evaluating race-conscious reforms in jury selection that is sensitive to this debate. My goal is not to displace the Court's
latest equal protection doctrine but to understand and apply it in a new
context. I consider what sorts of race-conscious selection methods are
permissible today, assuming that the key features of the Court's modem
equal protection cases-including strict scrutiny of both "benign" and
"invidious" uses of racial classifications-remain intact.
In Part I, I review the reasons that minorities remain underrepresented on juries and the various race-conscious measures that many
jurisdictions have embraced in order to counteract racially skewed juries
and jury pools. Part II explains why proponents of these jurymandering
schemes will soon face equal protection challenges and why they will
have difficulty meeting the exacting standards of strict scrutiny, as long
as the courts considering these challenges take the color-blind rhetoric in
Shaw at face value. In Part III, I advise against such a wooden application of these cases in the jury context. I argue that because of the unique
function and history of the criminal jury, race-consciousness at early
stages of jury selection may be upheld when "reasonably necessary" to
promote public confidence in the fairness of criminal jury proceedings.
I

A

DESCRIPTION OF RACE-CONSCIOUS SELECTION

PROCEDURES AND THE UNDERREPRESENTATION

THEY ARE INTENDED TO CURE

The Court has been striking down attempts to exclude AfricanAmerican citizens from juries for over a century. 8 Yet in many jurisdic8 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that statutory
exclusion of African Americans from jury service violated African -American defendant's right
to equal protection); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986) (holding that intentional
discrimination against African Americans in selection of grand jurors violated defendant's
equal protection rights); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans violated defendant's right to equal
protection); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-98 (1977) (holding that under-
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tions, jury selection policies that have survived constitutional challenges

continue to produce juries and jury pools with percentages of African
Americans and other racial or ethnic minorities that are smaller than the

percentages of these groups in the adult population of the jury district.
A.

Why MinoritiesAre Still Underrepresentedon CriminalJuries

Any examination of the causes and extent of underrepresentation
requires an overview of the process of selecting juries. Although selec-

tion methods vary widely, most involve four phases. First, jury districts
are created by statute or court rule; in some cases prosecutors or judges
may select a venue for a particular prosecution from among these districts. 9 Combined, these decisions define the geographic boundaries within which potential jurors must reside.' 0 Second, judges or commissioners
periodically create a source list, a list of names and addresses of residents
available for jury service in a given district.1 Third, jury commissioners
or other officials select from the source list a group of potential jurors
who meet qualifications specified by statute (the qualified list), and summon some or all of those qualified to come into court. 1 2 Fourth, from the
group that responds to the summons (the venire), the judge and the parties choose the jurors who will serve on each trial jury. Judges will select
grand jurors from the venire and will frequently choose the foreperson.
Procedures at each phase of jury selection continue to exclude
greater percentages of minorities than whites. In highly publicized cases,
changes of venue away from urban areas may decrease the percentage of

minority jurors available.13 Voter registration lists, the most common

representation of Americans of Mexican descent in grand jury venire established prima facie
case of intentional discrimination that was unrebutted by state).
9 Criminal cases are usually tried in the district in which the crime was committed. See
generally Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 737-60 (2d ed. 1992).
When multiple venues are appropriate, the prosecutor may choose among them. See id. at
742-46. Also, in some circumstances, a trial judge may order that a trial be moved, upon
motion of the defendant or, in some states, the prosecution. See id. at 747- 49.
10 See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, 781 P.2d 537, 541 (Cal. 1989) (en bane) (noting
discretion granted to governments to define boundaries of jury districts).
1 In most states, officials create source lists using existing lists of residents, such as voter
registration or driver's license lists. Some jurisdictions assign jury selectors the task of supplementing the designated list under certain circumstances. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2)
(1988) (providing that sources of names other than lists of registered voters may be required to
further policies of securing fair cross-section of community); Federal Judicial Center, Handbook on Jury Use in the Federal District Courts 12 (1989) [hereinafter Federal Jury Handbook] (discussing use of supplemental lists). Others grant considerable discretion to officials
who create jury source lists. See note 46 infra (listing state statutes).
12 In the federal system, the court will first choose a set number of jurors randomly from
the source list to create a shorter source list, called the "master wheel," and then will choose
qualified jurors from this master wheel. See Federal Jury Handbook, supra note 11, at 13-17.
13 See Timothy P. O'Neill, Wrong Place, Wrong Jury, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1992, at A23
(attributing acquittals of officers charged with beating African-American motorist Rodney
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source of juror names, 14 consistently underrepresent African-American
and Hispanic citizens who would otherwise be eligible to serve as jurors. 15

Also, some of the most common qualification procedures tend to
King to judge's decision to move trial from Los Angeles to predominantly white locality);
Mary B.W. Tabor, Jury Pool to Be Increased by 5000 in World Trade Center Bombing Trial,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1993, at B1, B2 (noting that defense lawyers say they are more likely to
get ethnically diverse jury in New York area than anywhere else); see also Margolick, supra
note 7, at 7 (quoting defense attorney who reasoned that from political, racial, and cultural
perspective, Simi Valley was as different from downtown Los Angeles "as Manhattan is from
the moon").
14 Only 12 federal districts use driver's license lists as source lists; the remaining districts
use voter registration lists exclusively. See Larry Marks et al., State of New York Unified
Court System, Increasing Jury Representativeness app. C (1992) (listing districts). The use of
voter registration lists is also widespread in the states. See id. (listing 13 states that draw jurors
exclusively from voter registration lists); see also Cynthia A. Williams, Note, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 590, 592 (1990)
(noting that vast majority of federal district courts rely exclusively on voter registration lists).
15According to the 1990 census, for instance, 59% of voting-age African Americans said
they were registered to vote, compared to 64% of voting-age whites. Of those registered, proportionately fewer African Americans than whites said that they actually voted (39% of African Americans compared to 47% of whites). The percentages of voting-age Hispanics who are
registered or who vote are even lower: in 1990, only 32% of voting-age Hispanics said that
they were registered and only 21% said they voted. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1992, at 269 (112th ed. 1992) (percentages rounded to nearest
whole number); see also Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury: Racial Disenfranchisement
and the Search for Justice 18-21 (1993) [hereinafter H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury]
(collecting studies documenting underrepresentation on voter registration lists).
Moreover, these figures underestimate the registration disparities between racial groups
because the census tends to undercount the number of minority citizens in the population and
relies on citizens to self-report their registration and voting history. Minorities tend to overreport registration and voting more than nonminorities. See City of Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F.3d
1367, 1371 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that 1990 census undercount rate for African Americans
was 4.8% compared to 1.7% for whites); Williams, supra note 14, at 607 (citing studies); see
also Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, Report on the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Report]
(finding that most states remove people who do not actually vote from registration lists, "a
practice which some believe tends to disproportionately affect persons of low incomes, and
blacks and other minorities"); H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra, at 50-51 (noting
that combined voter registration and driver's license lists tend to duplicate names of white
potential jurors more often than those of nonwhites, and noting difficulties of purging combined master file of duplicate names); Claude K. Rowland et al., The Effects of Selection System on Jury Composition, 4 Law & Pol. Q. 235, 246 (1982) (attributing lack of representation
of Americans of Mexican descent on federal grand juries in Texas to underrepresentation on
voter registration lists).
Studies show that many people do not register to vote because they know that the voter
registration list is used as a source for jurors. See, e.g., Stephen Knack, The Voter Participation Effects of Selecting Jurors From Registration Lists, 36 J.L. & Econ. 99, 109 (1993) (concluding that juror-source practices are a powerful determinant of voter registration). The
recently enacted National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1993)
(popularly known as the "Motor Voter" law), which allows a citizen to apply for a driver's
license and register to vote simultaneously, may reduce some disparity in voter registration
rates.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
68:707

screen out a greater proportion of minority jurors from source lists than

whites. For instance, many jurisdictions "qualify" jurors by selecting
only those who receive, complete, and return jury questionnaires. When

jury administrators fail to revise source lists frequently,' 6 people who
move often, particularly renters, never make it into the pool of qualified
jurors. Because minorities are statistically more mobile than whites, 17 a

greater percentage of minorities than whites never receive jury questionnaires mailed to outdated addresses.18 Minorities also return jury questionnaires at lower rates than whites. 19

From the group that does return questionnaires, jury selectors disqualify many, including those who they decide are not proficient in Eng21
lish 2 ° and those who have been convicted or charged with a felony.

16 See, e.g., Federal Jury Handbook, supra note 11, at 17 (noting that court must update its
master wheel every four years or less).
17See H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 22-23 (noting that 1986 study
demonstrated that for whites, average length of stay at current address was approximately 10
years, compared with about 2.5 years for African Americans); id. at 37 n.9 (noting study that
found over three years 48% of African Americans had moved, compared to approximately
25% of whites); Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis
of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection, 22 J. Black Stud. 196,
202-03 (1991) [hereinafter Fukurai et al., Jurors Go] (discussing residential and economic mobility of minorities).
18For instance, officials in Dane County, Wisconsin found that one-third of the jury questionnaires sent to African Americans were not deliverable, compared to only 14% of those sent
to whites. See Dane County Jury Study Comm., Final Report 7 (1993) [hereinafter Dane
County Report]; see also H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 48-51 (projecting that when source list is updated only every four years, 70.6% of African-American and
Hispanic potential jurors under 30 years of age would be missed, compared to 63.8% of whites
under 30, and that 43.4% of African Americans and Hispanics aged 30-54 would be missed,
compared to 30.6% of whites aged 30-54); id. at 23-25 (noting that jury commissioners typically do not track down "undeliverables," though such follow-up is required by law); see also
Hayward R. Alker, Jr. & Joseph J. Barnard, Procedural and Social Biases in the Jury Selection
Process, 3 Just. Sys. J.220, 226 (1977) (reporting study that found up to 14% ofjury questionnaires were never delivered or were lost in mail); id. at 232 (noting that lower return rate in
one community was due to out-of-date addresses on voter registration list); James Boudouris,
Jury Selection in Polk County, Iowa, 1 Forensic Rep. 237, 242 (1988) (reporting study finding
that 21.5% of jury questionnaires were undeliverable and 23.4% were not returned by
recipients).
19See Dane County Report, supra note 18, at 8 (noting that of questionnaires that were
delivered but not returned, 26% were sent to African Americans compared to 6% to whites);
H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 54 (explaining that many minorities see
no reason to participate in an institution "controlled by those who lord it over them"); R.
Treece et al., supra note 7, at 25-29 (finding that return rate from zip codes for areas where
residents are almost entirely non-Hispanic white was twice that of return rate from zip codes
for areas where more nonwhites lived, a finding authors termed "astounding"); id. at 45 (noting that visible segment of minority community purposefully avoids jury service). In Dane
County, when the undelivered and unreturned questionnaires were combined, the return rate
for African Americans was about half that of whites (41% compared to 80%). See Dane
County Report, supra note 18, at 8.
20 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-16-59(b)(3) (1986) (requiring prospective juror to indicate
whether she is "able to read, speak, understand and follow instructions given by a judge in the
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Additionally, jury commissioners in several states must apply subjective
criteria, selecting only the "most experienced, intelligent, and upright"
members of the community.2 2 Of those who meet these qualifications,
judges and jury clerks often excuse those who claim jury service would
create financial hardship or pose transportation difficulties.2 3 Because
members of minority ethnic and racial groups are more likely to be less
English language"); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102(a)(3) (Michie 1987) (disqualifying persons
unable to speak or understand English); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.1(a)(4) (Supp. 1992)
(requiring that jurors be "able to understand and participate in the court proceedings"). But
cf. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.2(a) (Supp. 1992) (providing for sign language interpreter for hearing-impaired jurors).
21 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (1988), which provides:
In making such determination the chief judge of the district ourt ... shall deem any
person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he... has a
charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or
Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
and his civil rights have not been restored.
Id.
22 Some states still give jury selectors the discretion to select as trial jurors only those
citizens who are "intelligent and upright" and impose even stricter requirements for grand
jurors. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-40 (1990) (requiring trial jurors to be "intelligent and
upright," and grand jurors to be "among the most experienced, intelligent and upright persons
of the county"). The Georgia Jury Commissioner's Handbook notes that in some circumstances, "the Commission must rely on its members' own personal knowledge of the county's
residents to delete their names... from the voter's.., list." Georgia Handbook, supra note 3,
at 12; see also Ala. Code. § 12-16-60(a) (1986) ("A prospective juror is qualified to serve on a
jury if the juror is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judgment . ... "); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31101(a)(7) (Michie 1987) (disqualifying "[p]ersons who are not of good character or approved
integrity, are lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information, are intemperate, or are not
of good behavior" from service as grand or petit jurors); Nijole Benokraitis, Racial Exclusion
in Juries, 18 J. Applied Behav. Sci. 29, 33-35 (1982) (finding that in 1982 approximately 74%
ofjury officials in Virginia, 52% of officials in Alabama, 64% of officials in Arkansas, and 35%
of officials in South Carolina disqualified the "non-intelligent," that 40-50% of officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina reported eliminating prospective jurors who were not
of "good character," and that 25-35% ofjury commissioners and district clerks in four Souther states eliminated prospective jurors who were deemed illiterate, although literacy was not a
criterion specified by law). See generally Fukurai et al., Jurors Go, supra note 17. Many
states, however, have abandoned such criteria. For example, West Virginia previously allowed
a judge "in his discretion" to disqualify from the jury the following groups of people: "Idiots,
lunatics, paupers, vagabonds, habitual drunkards, and persons convicted of infamous crimes."
W. Va. Code § 52-1-2 (1981) (amended 1986). The state legislature recently removed these
criteria and substituted two more specific categories of disqualified persons-citizens who have
lost the right to vote because of criminal conviction and citizens convicted of perjury, false
swearing, or other infamous offenses. See W. Va. Code § 52-1-8(b)(5), (6) (Supp. 1992).
23 See, e.g., Task Force on Racial Composition of the Grand Jury, Office of the Hennepin
County Attorney, Final Report 8 (1992) [hereinafter Hennepin County Report] (listing hardship as excuse); Alker & Barnard, supra note 18, at 236 (noting that federal jury clerks use
their discretion to excuse potential jurors for hardship); Boudouris, supra note 18, at 245 (reporting that in one Iowa county 6.5% of those granted excuses were excused due to "financial"
reasons). On the financial hardship imposed by jury service, see generally H. Fukurai et al.,
Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 119-40.
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proficient in English than whites, 24 to have fewer years of schooling, 25 to
be charged with or convicted of felonies, 26 to be unable to afford unreimbursed costs of jury service, 27 use of these qualification and excuse
24 See H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 53-54 (discussing 1986 California study showing that inability to meet English proficiency requirement disqualified 37%
of African-American and Hispanic males, 26% of African-American and Hispanic females,
25% of "other" males, 40% of "other" females, but only 7.5% of white males and 4.8% of
white females) (percentages rounded); Benokraitis, supra note 22, at 35 (stating that "[s]ince
disproportionate segments of the illiterate population are black... many may be disqualified
because they are seen as 'not intelligent' "). When questionnaires ask potential jurors about
their language skills, English proficiency may be self-assessed; otherwise an administrator or
judge will review the questionnaire or question each juror in person to decide whether her
answers are coherent enough to qualify.
25 When jury selectors use years of education as a proxy for "intelligence," fewer African
Americans are selected. See Fukurai et al., Jurors Go, supra note 17, at 211 n.5 (noting that
because jury members are expected to have at least high school education and proportionately
fewer African Americans finish high school, many African Americans are disqualified from
jury lists); see also Robert A. Carp & Claude K. Rowland, The Commissioner Method of
Selecting Grand Jurors: A Case of a Closed and Unconstitutional System, 14 Hous. L. Rev.
371, 393 (1977) (noting that commissioner-chosen grand juries tend to have higher education
levels than federal grand juries).
In one study reported in 1982, "low intelligence" was the most common reason judges
gave for excusing otherwise eligible African Americans from jury service. See Nijole Benokraitis & Joyce A. Griffin-Keene, Prejudice and Jury Selection, 12 J. Black Stud. 427, 43738 (1982); see also Benokraitis, supra note 22, at 35 (noting that the three states that specified
that prospective jurors must be "intelligent" also had largest underrepresentation of African
Americans on jury lists and highest reported use by court officials of "intelligence" as screening factor, and quoting jury commissioner stating opinion that African Americans are less
educated).
26 See United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding disqualification of
persons charged with felonies from jury pool despite disparate impact of such requirement on
African Americans, reasoning that requirement furthers significant state interest); Committee
on Jury Standards, ABA, Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management 39-40 (1993)
[hereinafter ABA Jury Standards] (recommending that convicted felons "who have not had
their civil rights restored" be excluded from jury service because many may resent the justice
system and unduly favor criminal defendants, and noting that their presence on juries would
weaken respect for judicial system). While African Americans make up only 12.4% of the
population, 44.8% of those arrested for violent crimes and 34.6% of those arrested for all
serious crimes in 1991 were African-American. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics-1992, at 434 (1992). Nearly 47% of those convicted of felonies in
state courts in 1990 were African-American. See id. at 528.
27 Jurors might not be compensated for lost wages by employers. See Hiroshi Fukurai &
Edgar W. Butler, Organization, Labor Force, and Jury Representation: Economic Excuses
and Jury Participation, 32 Jurimetrics J. 49, 55 (1991). Although some states require that
state employees be paid their regular wages during the time they serve as jurors, other employees who are not covered by these laws lose income when they serve as jurors. Juror fees are
nominal, ranging from nothing to $50 per day. See National Ctr. for State Courts, The Relationship of Juror Fees and Terms of Service to Jury System Performance 15, 37-47 (1991)
[hereinafter Juror Fees] (noting that significant portion of jurors surveyed reported that jury
service was financial burden).
Loss of income during jury service may hit members of minority groups particularly hard,
as their earnings, on average, are lower than those of whites. See, e.g., United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (observing that hardship excuse explains in sub-
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procedures reduces the proportion of minority jurors in the jury pool
28
even further.
Moreover, even though most jurisdictions randomly choose which
qualified potential jurors to summon as veniremembers, 29 the summoning process itself sometimes yields a lower percentage of minorities than
whites. 30 Proximity requirements, in particular, can disproportionately
exclude minorities from jury service in urban areas where racial groups
are residentially segregated and minority race precincts are not sampled
because of their distance from the courthouse. 3 1 Facially neutral criteria
stantial measure underrepresentation of poorer citizens on grand juries in district); People
v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 190 (Colo. 1993) (concluding that trial judge's choice of
veniremembers who had salaried jobs in order to prevent hardship constituted race-neutral
reason for exclusion of Spanish-surnamed individuals). A recent survey noted that 22% of
those with incomes over $40,000 have served on a trial jury, compared to 15% of those who
earn less than $40,000. See Archie S. Robinson, We the Jury: Who Serves, Who Doesn't,
USA Today, Jan. 1992, (Magazine), at 62.
Researchers attempting to determine the racial impact of excuses for economic hardship
have reached mixed conclusions. Compare J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 120-21
(1977) (stating economic hardship excuse reduces jury service by racial minorities) and National Minority Advisory Council on Crim. Just., The Inequality of Justice: A Report on
Crime and the Administration of Justice in the Minority Community 207 (1980) (noting lack
of public transportation to courthouses is factor that discourages participation of minorities in
juries) with H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 55 (discussing California
study finding greater percentage of white than minority jurors requested to be excused because
of economic hardship, although African-American and Hispanic jurors are more likely than
white jurors to ask to be excused from jury service because of personal obligation or difficulties
in traveling to courthouse) and Juror Fees, supra, at 52-53 (study of nearly 8500 persons who
participated injury service found that 18% of whites were granted "financially-based excuses"
compared to only 9% of nonwhites).
28 See Juror Fees, supra note 27, at 27 (noting that in comparison to state courts, "more
black jurors are excused in the federal court which is probably related to the longer term of
service"); R. Treece et al., supra note 7, at 29 (finding that for specific two-month period
rejection and exemption rates for minority respondents were much higher than for nonminority respondents-l1% and 8% respectively, compared to 4% and 2.5%).
29 See, e.g., Federal Jury Handbook, supra note 11, at 35 (advising that clerk or jury staff
select names of prospective jurors at random from qualified wheel).
30 Because people from minority racial groups are statistically more transient than whites,
time lags between the creation of qualified lists and the summoning stage will disproportionately exclude minority jurors unless efforts are taken to update addresses and to follow up on
no-shows. See H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 64 (noting that "residentially mobile groups of individuals are less likely to receive [jury] summonses"); cf. Atwell v.
Blackburn, 800 F.2d 502, 506 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that service of jury summons in
housing project was discontinued because of "fear of the [process server's] life"), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 920 (1987).
31 See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Cross Sectional Jury Representation or Systematic Jury
Representation? Simple Random and Cluster Sampling Strategies in Jury Selection, 19 J.
Crim. Just. 31, 33 (1991) ("Traditional methods of jury selection... [offer] no guarantee that
areas with a concentration of Blacks will be sampled and therefore no guarantee that the list of
potential jurors drawn will reflect the racial composition of the county."); see also, e.g., H.
Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 44 (noting that proximity requirements in
San Bernadino exclude rural Hispanic and Native-American residents); id. at 56-62, 166-90
(noting that traditional methods of jury selection based on simple random sampling are inade-
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for service as a grand juror or grand jury foreperson have also been applied by judges to exclude disproportionate numbers of racial and ethnic
minorities. 32 Finally, some evidence suggests that district attorneys
continue to exercise peremptory challenges to exclude disproportionate
33
numbers of minority veniremembers from trial juries.
Over the years, criminal defendants have challenged many selection
procedures that yield disproportionately low numbers of AfricanAmerican veniremembers, jurors, and forepersons. Courts, however,
have struck down only those selection practices that challengers prove
are intentional efforts to limit jury service opportunities by race 34 or

those selection criteria that create substantial underrepresentation and

cannot be justified by significant state interests. 35 Thus, the use of voter
registration lists, literacy qualifications, and hardship excuses continues
37
despite decades of litigation 36 and criticism by legal commentators.
quate because minority and ethnic groups are not equally distributed within jurisdiction and
recommending sampling method that would draw qualified jurors from each geographic area
in jury district).
A second wave of exemptions, deferrals, and excuses after jurors appear for service may
further exacerbate underrepresentation. See Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 9-10
(noting that many potential grand jurors are excused at this point for hardship considering
extended time commitment such service usually requires); see also H. Fukurai et al., Race and
the Jury, supra note 15, at 137 (noting California study that found that twice as many minority
women as white women asked to be excused after responding to summonses, and noting that
further research is needed to determine whether occupational exemptions exclude disproportionately more minority jurors).
32 See, e.g., People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 190 (Colo. 1993) (noting that judge's practice
of picking veniremembers who are highly educated and paid by salary rather than wage disproportionately excluded Spanish-surnamed persons); Andrews v. State, 443 So. 2d 78, 81-83 (Fla.
1983) (upholding judge's failure to choose any African-American grand jury forepersons, given
his explanation that he chose whoever demonstrated "[l]eadership and ability to preside over
the deliberations").
33 See, e.g., Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System,
16 Hamline L. Rev. 477, 570-71 (1993) [hereinafter Minnesota Task Force Report] (stating
that approximately half of all public defenders and judges surveyed believed prosecutors are
more likely to use peremptory challenges against minorities).
34 See note 8 supra (citing cases).
35 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-70 (1979) (finding unconstitutional Missouri
provision which provided automatic exemption for any women requesting not to serve); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (holding that Louisiana's special exemption for women
violated sixth and fourteenth amendments because it operated to exclude women from petit
juries).
36 Although challenges to selection procedures have at times prompted legislative reform,
courts have for the most part upheld the exclusive use of voter registration lists to create jury
lists. See Floyd v. Garrison, 996 F.2d 947, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding Arkansas's use
of voter registration lists); Williams, supra note 14, at 592 n.17, 602 n.78, 626 n.246 (citing
cases). But see People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 446 (Cal.) (holding that sole use of voter
registration list violates sixth amendment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
For further discussion, see Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) (suggesting that financial hardship excuse for wage earners is justifiable); United States v.
Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that state's significant interest in having
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The cumulative result is that in many communities across the country,
the percentage of minority veniremembers, trial and grand jurors, and
grand jury forepersons is significantly lower than the percentage of minority adults living in the communities from which they are drawn. 38
B.

Race-Conscious Jury Selection

In order to avoid the undesirable consequences of racially unrepresentative juries (consequences I will explore in Part IV), administrators,
courts, and legislators have turned to selection procedures that take account of race. These procedures are designed to prevent racial underrepresentation by ensuring a certain proportion of minority jurors.
These jurymandering techniques take many forms.
branch of national court system operate in national language rebutted defendant's prima facie
showing that English proficiency requirement for jurors resulted in underrepresentation), cert.
denied sub nom. Nieves v. United States, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982); Cerrone, 854 P.2d at 193
(finding that judge's practice of picking most highly educated veniremembers, veniremembers
paid by salary rather than wage, and geographically diverse residents for grand jury venire
were race-neutral reasons that rebutted prima facie case of intentional discrimination against
Spanish-surnamed persons); State v. Paz, 798 P.2d 1, 6-11 (Idaho 1990) (upholding English
proficiency requirement, citizenship requirement, and existing follow-up procedures for those
who fail to respond to questionnaires), cert. denied sub noma. Paz v. Idaho, 11 S. Ct. 2911
(1991); Simon v. State, No. 90-KA-0904, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 431 (Miss. Sept. 30, 1993) (en
banc) (holding venue change that decreased opportunity of African-American defendant to
obtain African-American jurors did not violate defendant's constitutional rights); Mallet v.
Missouri, 769 S.W.2d 77, 79-81 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1009
(1990); People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1146-49 (N.Y. 1983) (upholding use of questionnaires and summonses to select jurors despite lower response rate of Hispanics and higher
disqualification rate for Hispanics on the basis of English literacy problems), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 951 (1984).
37 In particular, legal commentators have repeatedly criticized the acceptance of voter registration lists as the sole source of juror names. See Alker & Barnard, supra note 18, at 237-39
(concluding that efficiency and competency rationales for requiring jurors to be drawn only
from voter registration lists fail); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for
Multiple Source Lists, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 776, 809-11 (1977) (arguing that states have no legitimate interest in declining to supplement voter registration lists with more representative lists);
Williams, supra note 14, at 621-30 (noting that use of voter registration lists systematically
underrepresents minorities and is not sufficiently related to significant state interest, and suggesting that judges would invalidate such plans more frequently if they were aware of inaccuracies in census data and if they better understood difference between sixth and fourteenth
amendment challenge to underrepresentation).
38 See ABA Task Force on Minorities & the Justice System, Achieving Justice in a Diverse
America 15 (1992) [hereinafter ABA Report] ("Juror pools may be disproportionately Caucasian, and selection techniques that make juror pools a fairer cross-section of the community are
not as widely implemented as they should be to ensure representative venires."); Dane County
Report, supra note 18, at 6 ("The Committee heard a considerable amount of anecdotal information from judges, attorneys, and citizens indicating that there did not appear to be a fair
cross-section of minorities and other segments of the community who may not be on the Department of Transportation lists.... The data... supported the anecdotal information and
showed that African-Americans are underrepresented on actual juries in Dane County."); H.
Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 3 (citing sources).
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Venue Choices and Jury DistrictBoundaries

Following two recent, highly publicized cases in which a change of
venue significantly altered the racial composition of the available jury
pool, 39 legislators in several states introduced measures that would require courts to consider race when evaluating a request for a change of
venue."0 In Florida, for example, trial judges must now "give priority to
any county which closely resembles the demographic composition of the
county wherein the original venue would lie."'4 1 Similar measures proposed in other states refer to race specifically. 42 These rules would require judges to consider the race of potential jurors when deciding
whether they will have the opportunity to serve as jurors in a particular
43
case.
39 I refer here to the state prosecution of the Los Angeles police officers charged with
beating African-American motorist Rodney King and the Florida homicide trial of Miami
police officer William Lozano. For a detailed description of these cases, see Gilbert, supra note
7, at 1868-82.
40 Some sponsors of race-conscious initiatives have explicitly mentioned the Rodney King
case as a reason for their proposals. See, e.g., New York State Assembly Memorandum in
Support of Legislation 1 (1993) (Sen. Joseph L. Galiber, Senate Sponsor, Assembly Member G.
Oliver Koppell, Assembly Sponsor) (supporting A.B. 3489, listing public concern about venue
change in Rodney King case as justification for mandate to consider racial demographics of
jury pool); New Jersey Supreme Court Ad Hoc Comm. on Jury Selection, Final Report 30-31
(Oct. 1993) [hereinafter New Jersey Report] (noting that court rule requiring consideration of
demographics responds to concerns raised by King case). Pending bills as of February 1, 1994
include A.B. 1458, N.J. 205th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1992-1993) and A.B. 3489, N.Y. Assembly
Reg. Sess. (1993-1994). A bill in Texas recently died in committee. See S.B. 285, Tex. 73d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1992-1993). A similar bill passed the California legislature, but was vetoed. See S.B. 159, Cal. Reg. Sess. (1993-1994) (vetoed by governor Sept. 7, 1993). In August
of 1993, the American Bar Association approved its new Standards for Criminal Justice: Trial
by Jury, including Standard 15-1.4 "Change of venue or continuance," reprinted in 53 Crim.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2347, 2348 (Sept. 29, 1993)) [hereinafter ABA Criminal Justice Standards]
(providing, inter alia, that court, in determining where to move trial, should consider "[t]he
racial, ethnic, religious and other relevant demographic characteristics of the proposed venue,
insofar as they may affect the likelihood of a fair trial by an impartial jury").
41 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 225.
42 In New York, for example, the bill introduced last year would require judges to consider
whether the destination county is similar to the original venue in terms of "racial, ethnic and
other demographic composition." A.B. 3489, N.Y. Assembly Reg. Sess. (1992-1993). The
Texas bill would have defined the "demographics" which judges must "most closely match" as
"the relative proportion of racial minorities in the population, including the proportions of
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Latin-Americans, and Native-Americans." S.B. 285,
Tex. 73d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993-1994).
43 See, e.g., Trial Is Moved for 2 Charged in Burning of Brooklyn Man, N.Y. Times, June
23, 1993, at A9 (stating that Florida judge rejected Fort Myers as transfer site for Tampa case
involving trial of two white men accused of burning African-American tourist "because the
racial composition of its population was not similar to that of Tampa"); see also Gilbert, supra
note 7, at 1882-86 (describing Mississippi judge's decision in murder prosecution of Byron De
La Beckwith to select jurors from county that has racial composition similar to original location). The American Bar Association's recent decision to recommend that judges consider
race when ordering change of venue in criminal cases, see note 40 supra, followed a task force
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In New York, the Capital District Black Bar Association, in one of
several reports now under consideration by The Jury Project, a special
group appointed by the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
has recommended an additional method of structuring the racial composition of populations from which jurors are drawn. The report recommends that jury districts, similar to voting districts under the Voting
Rights Act, be constructed with race in mind, in order to "increase, not
minimize minority influence on those matters that transpire in the heart
of their community." 44
2.

Source Lists
Other jurisdictions have used racial classifications to ensure repre-

sentativeness on their source lists. 4 5 In jurisdictions that delegate the

creation of jury lists to commissioners or judges rather than adopting
preexisting lists such as voter registration or driver's license lists, jury
commissioners have used race to create lists of potential jurors that reflect the racial composition of the eligible population. 4 6 Other jurisdictions require officials to review the source list periodically and supplefinding that the Los Angeles riots after the verdicts in People v. Powell "demonstrate the
profound problems that attend a change of venue in a racially or ethnically charged case if the
demographics of the county to which the case is removed are not similar to the demographics
of the county where the incident occurred." ABA Report, supra note 38, at 14-15.
44 R. Treece et al., supra note 7, at 52-54. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Ad Hoc
Committee on Jury Selection in criminal cases also recently considered expanding the size of
the district from which jurors are drawn in particular cases. The Committee ultimately rejected the option, concluding that efforts to classify those cases which required expanded pools
would cause constitutional, fiscal, and logistical problems. See New Jersey Report, supra note
40, at 24-25.
45 Related suggestions include requiring that a certain percentage of the jury commissioners who select jury lists be nonwhite. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 342-43 (1970)
(Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that jury commissions must include representatives of
minority races); cf. Larry Rohter, Lozano Case Tests How Racially Balanced a Jury Must Be,
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1993, at D3 (noting Florida governor's veto of legislation that would
have required proportional representation by race and sex on nonelective state boards and
commissions).
46 In Texas, commissioners are directed by statute to consider race in order to select grand
jurors who represent a cross-section of the county population. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 19.06 (West 1994); see also Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that
commissioners deliberately placed two African Americans on list of 16 potential grand jurors),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir.) (noting that
commissioners specially included six African Americans on list of 20 potential grand jurors),
cert. denied sub nom. Hanchey v. Collins, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); Carp & Rowland, supra note
25, at 381 (noting that most commissioners interviewed reported that their judges encouraged
just enough diversity to immunize panel from later charge of grand jury discrimination, and
noting that African-American jury commissioner understood his job was to pick several potential minority jurors); Rowland et al., supra note 15, at 245-56 (noting that jury commissioners
in two Texas counties were prompted by successful defense claims of jury discrimination to
"exercise their discretion to encourage minority representation and to prevent the quashing of
future indictments" and suggesting that lack of female representation on those same grand
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ment it with other lists or with names of individuals if it underrepresents
particular groups.4 7

3. Qualified Lists and Venires
Some courts take an active role in ensuring that qualified lists or

venires reflect the racial composition of the adult population. 48 For more
than a decade, the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Michigan has adjusted its qualified juror list to reflect the racial cornjuries was due to failure of defense bar to challenge female exclusion).
At least five states in addition to Texas still delegate discretion to commissioners or others
to select the original source list for grand or trial jurors, allowing them, perhaps, the opportunity to deliberately select a racially balanced list. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-45(a) (West
1990) (stating that superior court selects grand jury); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-40 (1993) (requiring that commissioners select grand jury list from voter registration list and allowing commissioners to supplement this if not representative); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 408 (West
Supp. 1992) (requiring that commissioners compile at least 300 names for "general venire" and
that names then should be drawn randomly from that pool for qualification into smaller
venires); Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-302 (Supp. 1993) (allowing jury commissioners to supplement tax records and driver's license lists with "other available and reliable sources"); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-194-195 (Michie Supp. 1993) (requiring that judges select between 60 and
120 people to be on grand jury list, then handpick five to seven of those to be summoned);
Charles R. DiSalvo, The Key-Man System for Composing Jury Lists in West Virginia-The
Story of Abuse, the Case for Reform, 87 W.Va. L. Rev. 219, 244-45 (1985) (noting that jury
commissioner responsible for compiling list of about 2000 names for petit juries and 150 names
for grand juries stated in 1982 that he "asked a couple of prominent coloreds" to give him "a
list of about twenty or so to put in the box," and noting that commissioner stated that he too
put names of about 20 African Americans on his half of list). But see Letter from Jerry P.
Slonaker, Chief, Appellate Section, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia, to author (Sept. 22, 1993) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (asserting
that he is "aware of no effort to use or authorize racial criteria [in selecting juries in Virginia],
albeit in terms of artificially infusing more minorities into the process").
47 See Berryhill v. State, 291 S.E.2d 685, 690-91 (Ga. 1982) (upholding jury commissioner's decision to supplement source list drawn from voter registration list with target
number of nonregistered women); Georgia Handbook, supra note 3, at 6-7 (allowing commissioners to supplement voter registration lists with names of new residents known to commissioners and those who have requested to serve); see also The Franklin H. Williams Jud.
Comm'n on Minorities, Commissioner of Jurors Survey 3 (1993) [hereinafter Williams Commission Survey] (noting that 74% of jury commissioners responding in New York State had
prepared special mailings to minority organizations, congregations, or churches); cf. United
States v. Bennett, 445 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting defendant's claim that use of
voter registration list alone violated 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2), which provides that other sources
for juror names shall be used when voter registration lists fail to protect defendant's right to
impartial jury drawn from fair cross-section of community), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023
(1972).
48 See generally G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T. Munsterman, The Search for Jury
Representativeness, 11 Just. Sys. J. 59, 60 (1986) (describing process of separating or stratifying jury lists into cognizable groups and sampling each group to include desired representation of various strata, a process that can be used to select jury candidates from source or
qualified list); id. at 74 ("With the understandable frustration of courts, which, despite multiple lists, still do not achieve acceptable representation of particular cognizable groups, a stratified selection technique could be attractive.").
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position of the district. In 1982, the judges of the Eastern District revised their jury selection plan after discovering that the process of
qualifying potential jurors with questionnaires randomly sent to residents
listed on voter registration and driver's license lists yielded a qualified
wheel 49 with only fourteen percent African Americans, a figure significantly lower than the nineteen percent African-American population
in the Detroit administrative unit's district. 50 The court identified the
number of additional African-American qualified jurors that it would
need to increase the proportion of African Americans on each qualified
list to the level reflected in the population and the number of questionnaires needed to generate that number. It then sent additional questionnaires to residents in areas in which African Americans constituted sixtyfive percent or more of the population. 5 1 This process, called "transfusion," produced a balanced qualified wheel. 52 Subsequently, the Eastern
District changed to a different, yet also race-conscious, technique for
achieving balanced qualified lists. Instead of "transfusing" a carefully
calculated number of African Americans into each randomly generated
list, it has recently achieved the same results by "purging" (my term, not
theirs) a carefully calculated number of whites. 53 The Jury Project in
49 The "qualified wheel" consists of the names of all persons drawn from the master jury
wheel who are determined by the clerk to be qualified as jurors and who are not exempted or
excused pursuant to a district's jury plan. To be qualified, a person must promptly return a

mailed questionnaire to the clerk, showing that he or she is a United States citizen, is able to
read, write, speak, and understand English, is capable mentally and physically to serve, and
has no pending criminal felony charges or felony convictions. Those in active military service,
police officers, fire fighters, and public officials are exempt; those who are over 70 years of age,
ambulance crewmembers, volunteer fire fighters, or recent jurors, and those for whom jury
service "would entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience" may also be excused from
service. Federal Jury Handbook, supra note 11, at 19-29.
50 See Robert A. Mossing, Changes in the Eastern District of Michigan Detroit Administrative Unit's Jury System, Mich. B.J. 33, 34 (Jan. 1984).
51 See id.

52 Id. A similar procedure was apparently inadvertently conducted by another federal
court. See Alker & Barnard, supra note 18, at 235 (noting that according to court officials,
African-American precincts in Boston area were mistakenly "oversampled").
53 See U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Jury Selection Plan (certified Apr.
1992):
The qualified jury wheel shall be composed of persons who represent a fair cross-section
of the area of each place of holding court as set forth in Section III of this Plan. To this
end, if the Court determines that a cognizable group of persons is substantially overrepresented in the qualified jury wheel, the Chief Judge shall order the Clerk to remove
randomly a specific number of names so that the population of each cognizable group in
the qualified wheel closely approximates the percentage of the population of each group
in the area of each place of holding court, according to the most recently published
national census report.
Id. at VIII.B.
For example, on June 16, 1993, Chief Judge Julian Cook found that the list of 3914 qualified jurors randomly selected from source lists in the Ann Arbor jury district contained only
14.06% African Americans, compared to 23.41% African Americans in the district's six-
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New York State is considering proposals for "weighted mailings" similar

to those used by the federal court in Detroit;54 some New York state
courts have already used this targeted mailing technique. 55

In Georgia, the jury commissioner's handbook actually requires jury
commissioners to engineer the racial composition of every list of qualified

grand and petit jurors, a process it calls "balancing the box."' 56 Each
county's voter registration list, which by statute serves as the jury source
list, 57 designates the race of registered voters. The handbook explains the
method to be used whenever commissioners create their qualified list or
58
"box" by hand rather than with a computer:
[A]s the Jury Commissioners qualify individuals, each person's name
can be placed in the proper group such as black female, black male,
white female, white male. At the end of the process, the names can be
tallied for each group and compared to the county census figures ....
[I]f there is a disparity for any identifiable group, the Jury Commissioners should supplement the list until the representation of that
group parallels as closely as possible the members of the group in the
community. 59
county population. He ordered the Clerk of the Court to remove 1574 "White and Other"
jurors from this list. "As a result of this procedure," the order continued, "the 1993 Qualified
Ann Arbor Wheel shall be composed of 548 Black Qualified Jurors and 1,792 White and Other
Qualified Jurors." U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Administrative Order
No. 93-AO-057 (June 16, 1993). The jury administrator in Detroit described this system as
much easier to implement than the earlier system of supplemental mailings. Telephone Interview with Jean Schmidt, Jury Administrator, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan (June 7, 1993).
54 See R. Treece et al., supra note 7, at 29.
55 See Seventh Judicial District, News Release (Sept. 16, 1993) (noting that jury commissioner in Monroe County, New York, used zip code information to target mailing of over
143,000 juror qualification questionnaires to areas with large minority populations). Seventh
Judicial District Administrative Judge Charles L. Willis stated in the release that the targeted
mailings were an effort to "publicly reiterate[ ] the commitment of the Unified Court System to
the integrity and fairness of the jury system with the goal of sharing the opportunity of jury
service among the greatest number of our citizens." Id.; see also L. Marks et al., supra note 14,
at 11 (noting that Schenectady County Commissioner of Jurors was recently reported to be
targeting mailings to minority neighborhoods); Williams Commission Survey, supra note 47, at
3-4 (noting that 35% of 50 jury commissioners responding "increased the number of mailings
to prospective minority jurors," and 74% "prepared special mailing to minority organizations" and "had increased the number of qualifying forms to the minority community").
56 Georgia Handbook, supra note 3, at 18.
57 See Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-40(a)(1) (1990).
58 Counties revise these lists every six months to two years. See id.
59 Georgia Handbook, supra note 3, at 19-22. Georgia's jury commissioners are required
by court rule to certify in every capital case that the qualified list from which a capital defendant's grand and trial juries were drawn reflects the racial and gender proportions in the population. See id. (explaining Unified App. Rule 34.3); see also Munsterman & Munsterman,
supra note 48, at 75 (describing system in place in Savannah and Atlanta that selects jurors
from voter registration lists according to their race and sex). Stratified selection procedures
have been used for years to insure quotas for geographic representation. See id. at 74-75.
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The handbook advises that counties with computerized selection systems
can perform identical sortings by race. 6° Whenever the first random
draw from the voter registration list fails to mirror the racial composition
of the voting age population, commissioners then must go back to their
voter registration lists to retrieve enough additional registered African
Americans or other "identifiable groups" to "balance the box."' 6 1 In
some counties, the representation of particular groups on the voter registration list (e.g., young African-American males) may be so far below
that group's representation in the voting age population that even drawing from the voter list alone produces too few names. In such cases,
commissioners must obtain names of people in the underrepresented
groups from sources other than the voter registration list in order to pro62
duce a "balanced box."
Some courts may attempt to summon racially representative venires
from their qualified lists.63 In Kalamazoo County, Michigan, for instance, a judicial task force has recommended to the county judges that
source lists and qualification questionnaires be modified to include infor-

mation on race, so that jury officials can guarantee that "jury panels from
which prospective trial jurors are selected have minority representation,
black and Hispanic in particular, of at least 25 percent to reenfranchise
the minority citizens who have been systematically excluded for at least
the past five years." 64 Other judges may use affirmative action to diversify venires in individual cases. For instance, in a recent Minnesota case
involving a Hispanic defendant, the judge ordered his jury clerk to add
more Hispanics to the jury pool after learning that only one of the 173
60 See Georgia Handbook, supra note 3, at 19.

61Telephone Interview with Holly K.O. Sparrow, Senior Research Associate, Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts (July 2, 1993).
62 Id. For an example of a procedure similar to Georgia's, see Ronald W. Crenshaw, Note,
Jury Composition-The Purposeful Inclusion of American Indians, 16 S.D. L. Rev. 214, 21516 (1971) (describing federal court order requiring county jury selectors to submit qualified
jury list that approximates racial composition of general population).
63 Earlier examples of this technique include James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467, 472
(4th Cir. 1969) (approving plan under which Mississippi clerk summoned exact proportion of
African Americans and women as appeared in census); Mack v. Walker, 372 F.2d 170, 172
(5th Cir. 1966) (approving Louisiana commissioner's system of summoning 20 jurors from
qualified general venire of 300 by race in proportion to their population in the community, and
also distributing them geographically); Sewell v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 306 F. Supp. 179,
180-81 (D. Md. 1969) (approving method whereby grand jurors were chosen randomly from
box of 200 names which had been selected with race in mind).
64 Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at 13-14; see also Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235, 315-17 (1968) (proposing that in order to
achieve fairer representation of African Americans on juries, African Americans should be
summoned for jury service in greater numbers than they appear in population because they are
disproportionately excused, and recommending system of group sampling).
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prospective jurors was Hispanic. 65
4.

Grand Juries

The most controversial efforts to achieve proportional representation involve race-based selection of grand jurors from the venire. 66 In
Hennepin County, Minnesota, where about nine percent of the adult
population is African-American, Asian-American, or Native-American, 67 the courts are implementing a new rule that requires judges to
select at least two minority grand jurors for every twenty-three member
capital grand jury so the racial composition of each grand jury would
mirror that of the community. The experimental system works like this:
[If], after randomly selecting the first 21 grand jurors either only one
or no minority persons appear on the panel, selection [shall] continue
down the list of 55 randomly selected and qualified persons until there
are at least two minority persons out of 23 on the grand jury. If no
minorities appear in the list of 55 potential grand jurors, another 55
qualified persons should be selected until the goal of at least two minority jurors is obtained. If random selection of the first 21 grand jurors yields two or more minority persons, the selection should simply
68
proceed to the next two persons on the list.

The Third Circuit, sitting en banc in Ramseur v. Beyer,69 recently
reviewed a judge's deliberate efforts to achieve proportional racial representation on a grand jury in New Jersey. The judge had stated candidly
65 See Paul Gustafson, Judges Study Ways to Raise Minority Count in the Jury Box, Minneapolis Star Trib., Nov. 30, 1992, at 1A. This is somewhat like an intriguing alternative
proposed by Professor Deborah Ramirez. See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the
Ancient Custom of "de medietate linguae" (Feb. 22, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the New York University Law Review). Professor Ramirez's proposal allows litigants
the opportunity to choose a smaller group who will form a mini-venire from the group of
veniremembers remaining after the judge has excused those disqualified for cause. The judge
and litigants would then select the jury from this mini-venire using traditional voir dire procedures. See id. Professor Ramirez suggests allowing litigants the option of choosing members
of the mini-venire by race-what she calls "affirmative peremptory choice"-but prohibiting
the final selection of jurors from the mini-venire by race. See id. at 58-62. The proposal does
not guarantee minority representation on trial juries, but it provides a better chance for the
litigant to obtain minority race jurors if she wants them and does not single out race as the
only salient group characteristic that may be of importance to litigants.
66 The practice of using race as a criterion for selecting grand jurors has a lengthy and
uneven history. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (described in text accompanying notes 86-88 infra); Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d 657, 661 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Consciousness
of race in the selection process is sometimes necessary to avoid discrimination .... "); Brooks
v. Beto, 366 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding race-based selection practice); Fuller v. Cox,
356 F. Supp. 1185, 1188-89 (W.D. Va. 1973) (striking down judge's practice of always including one African American on each of 47 different grand juries because this practice had exclusive effect).
67 See Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 27.
68 Id. at 45.
69 983 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
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that he tried to select a "fair cross-section" when choosing grand jurors
from the venire, a racial mix that he considered to be about 50/50 or 60/
40 white/African-American. 70 Race balancing at these later stages of
selection may be attractive in jurisdictions in which the race of potential
71
jurors is not disclosed until the jurors respond to their summonses.
It is impossible to say how widespread race-balancing of the type
described in Ramseur or proposed in Hennepin County really is.72 However, at least five states do not require that grand juror names be drawn
randomly from the grand jury venire and instead allow judges or commissioners the discretion to select who will actually serve as grand jurors.7 3 This kind of discretion may enable local officials to "balance the
70 Id. at 1223 n.4. The judges of the Third Circuit divided over whether this procedure
violated the equal protection clause, and, if so, whether granting postconviction relief to the
defendant was an appropriate remedy.
71 The trial judge in Ramseur, for example, did not know the race of potential jurors until
they showed up in court. See id. at 1235-36. Jurisdictions that seek to employ race-conscious
methods earlier in the process, of course, first must obtain racial information about those on
their source or qualified lists. The Kalamazoo proposal described earlier, see text accompanying note 64 supra, also includes a recommendation that the court seek authority to specify race
on driver's license lists to "insure greater minority participation in the jury selection process"
and to "include race and ethnic group information on the jury qualification questionnaire"
because "state court jury questionnaires do not contain race or ethnic information... [thus
making] it impossible to know the makeup of the [venire] until the prospective jurors are
actually seated in the courtroom at the time of jury selection." Kalamazoo Report, supra note
3, at 4, 14-15; see also Letter from Miriam S. Saxon, Court Management Specialist, Administrative Office of the Courts of North Carolina to author (Sept. 13, 1993) (on file with the New
York University Law Review) (noting that in North Carolina, neither voter registration lists
nor driver's license lists contain information about person's race).
72 While the court in Ramseur noted that it had been advised that the selection process of
the New Jersey judge was no longer in effect, 983 F.2d at 1223 n.3, the judge's techniques are
not unique. In 1985, a bill was introduced in California to achieve proportional racial representation on grand juries. See Charley Roberts, Test for Ethnic Makeup of Grand Juries
Gains, L.A. Daily J.,May 16, 1985, at 2 (noting that California Assembly Bill 197, reported
out of Ways and Means Committee to full Assembly, would require that judge appointing
grand jurors consider county's demographics and would strive to achieve proportional representation based on race, ethnicity, and sex). And in a recent case from Colorado, a judge's
"effort to affirmatively place people from minority groups on the grand jury" and his "sensitiv[ity] to having a good cross-section of women, blacks and Hispanics" helped the state
supreme court to conclude that the total exclusion of Spanish-surnamed people from a defendant's grand jury venire was not attributable to intentional discrimination by the judge. See
People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 192 & n.24, 193 (Colo. 1993).
73 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-45(a) (West 1985) (providing that judge selects grand
jury); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 413(C) (West 1991) (providing that in New Orleans
Parish judge selects 12 grand jurors and two alternates from randomly selected grand jury
venire); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1633 (1989) (providing that in larger counties commissioner randomly draws 40 names from randomly selected grand jury wheel and forwards those names to
board-made up of presiding judge, commissioner, and one other person-that in turn selects
from 40 names 16 to serve as grand jurors, plus three alternates); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 6.120
(1991) (providing that in smaller Nevada counties the clerk summons 36 people, whose names
are generated by random and self-selection, and from these 36 people judges take turns selecting 17 grand jurors and 12 alternates); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-194-195 (Michie 1990) (provid-
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box" by race when they think it is appropriate to do so.
5. Trial Juries
No court or legislature has yet adopted rules that would require trial
juries to contain certain percentages of minority jurors, despite repeated
suggestions for such policies by academics.7 4 In at least one state, these
ideas have made it beyond the pages of law reviews into the legislature.
Presently pending in Pennsylvania's House Judiciary Committee is a bill
that would provide for a certain number of trial jurors who share the
race of the defendant or victim, depending on the percentage of persons
of that race in the population. 75 Others maintain that peremptory challenges of white jurors by African-American defendants should be exempt
from the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. McCollum. 76 This would allow African-American defendants to improve their
chances of securing African-American jurors. 77 Yet another recent proposal recommends dividing urban jury districts into twelve geographic
jury seat districts drawn along racial, ethnic, and economic divides, then
filling each seat on every twelve-member criminal jury with one resident
from each district. 78
ing that judges must select five to seven grand jurors from 60 to 120 they selected as
veniremembers); Jefferson v. Morgan, 962 F.2d 1185, 1187 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing Tennessee system whereby judge picks grand jurors by hand).
74 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611, 1698-99 (1984) (recommending that each jury have at least three jurors of same race as
defendant); Tracy L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge Abuse, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 806-08 (1986) (arguing that "[a]ifirmative selection" of
juries is necessary to achieve proper representation of minorities); MacDougall, supra note 7,
at 537 (proposing proportional representation scheme for trial juries); see also Diane Potash,
Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 Black L.J. 80, 94-95 (1973) (arguing that judges and legislatures should compel those who select jurors to take account of race).
75 See H.B. 1182, Pa. 176th Gen. Assembly, 1993-1994 Sess., 1993 (pending as of Mar. 1,
1994).
76 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (discussed at text accompanying notes 111-13 infra).
77 See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 5, McCollum
(No. 91-372) (as amicus curiae suggesting reversal); Jeanette M. Boerner, Note, The Discriminatory Effect of the "Color-Blind" Jury: Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), 16
Hamline L. Rev. 975, 999-1000 (1993) (noting that Court has yet to determine whether Constitution permits minority defendant to use peremptory challenge to get more minority jurors).

See generally Deborah Zalesne & Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The
Case for a Narrow Interpretation of McCollum, 70 Denver U. L. Rev. 313 (1993) (arguing
against reading of McCollum that would prohibit African-American defendant from using
peremptory challenge to strike white potential jurors).
78 See Lindsay R.M. Jones, Democratizing the Jury Selection Process: A Multi-Pool Stratification Model 2-3 (1993) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (proposal for

the Minneapolis Urban League and Attorney General of State of Minnesota). Apparently,

Great Britain is also considering race-conscious trial jury selection techniques. See Michael
Prescott, Judges May Get Veto on All-White Juries, The Sunday Times (London), July 4, 1993
(noting proposals by Royal Commission of Criminal Justice providing judges power to select
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6. Forepersons
Finally, a judge may consider race when selecting who will serve as
foreperson of a grand jury. Judges, trying to be fair or wary of claims
that they discriminate when selecting grand jury forepersons, may intentionally appoint African Americans to lead grand juries as often as necessary to meet or exceed statistical probabilities. Again, proof that this
happens is not easily available, but reported selection practices suggest
that it does. In Louisiana, the Director of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice noted a recent decision vacating a conviction due
to a judge's failure to appoint African Americans as grand jury forepersons, and stated: "With that decision now on the books, it appears to me
that Louisiana judges will begin considering policies that will allow them
to take affirmative action to ensure that minorities are fairly represented
as members and forepersons of grand and petit juries. ' 79 One 1979 case
described a judge who "religiously alternates" between men and women
in his selection of successive grand jury forepersons.80 Another more recent case from North Carolina offers the following example of race-conscious foreperson selection: a judge quashed a defendant's indictment
after the defendant successfully demonstrated discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons-no African American had ever been appointed grand jury foreperson in that county.81 At the suggestion of the
prosecutor, the judge then replaced the foreperson of the grand jury, who
was white, with an African-American grand juror. 82
II
EVALUATING RACE-CONSCIOUS SELECTION PROCEDURES
AFTER CROSON, SHAW, AND MCCOLLUM

The subsequent events in the North Carolina foreperson case just
described illustrate the constitutional difficulties such race-conscious jury
selection practices may raise. After the judge replaced the white foreman
with an African American, the grand jury with its new leader promptly
re-indicted the defendant. The defendant then challenged the second indictment, again alleging intentional race discrimination in the selection
of the grand jury foreperson. The state's high court agreed with the defendant that the judge had violated the rights of the white foreman whom
jurors on basis of race and ethnicity in order to further interests of justice).
79 Letter from L.J. Hymel, Director, Criminal Division, Louisiana Department of Justice,
to author (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
80 See United States v. Jenison, 485 F. Supp. 655, 665-66 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding that
such practice does not constitute discrimination entitling accused to relief in federal courts).
81 See State v. Moore, 404 S.E.2d 845, 846 (N.C. 1991).
82 Id.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:707

he had replaced, vacated the defendant's conviction, and instructed the
trial court to start over.8 3 While the North Carolina Supreme Court
based its ruling on the equal protection guarantees of that state's constitution, federal equal protection guarantees in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments provide grounds for similar defense challenges. The following Sections examine how such challenges would probably fare under the
most recent equal protection decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
A.

The Presence of Equal Protection Injury and the Level of Scrutiny
Supporters of jurymandering techniques have so far relied upon two
alternative arguments for the claim that such initiatives are exempt from
strict scrutiny or create no equal protection injury at all: (1) race-conscious selection practices are not objectionable because they "include"
rather than "exclude" individuals based on their race;8 4 and (2) such
practices do not deprive whites who are potential jurors of any opportunities they deserve.8 5 As passionately as these arguments have been
made, they are unlikely to persuade the present Supreme Court, which
has made it clear that it will apply the most exacting scrutiny to all stateinitiated racial classifications, regardless of their alleged purpose or effect.
1.

Exclusion or Inclusion

The modem effort to distinguish selection policies that "include"
persons on the basis of race from policies that "exclude" persons on that
basis apparently originated in a concurring opinion written forty-four
years ago in Cassell v. Texas.8 6 Because Cassell is the only case in which
the Supreme Court has considered an equal protection challenge to a
race-conscious jury selection practice that arguably achieved proportional minority representation, it merits some examination here.
Between 1942 and 1947, jury commissioners in Dallas County,
Texas, allegedly chose exactly one African-American grand juror for
each of twenty-one consecutive grand juries, so as to approximate the
proportion of African Americans in the pool of eligible grand jurors.8 7 A
83 See id. at 848.
84 See note 91 and accompanying text infra (noting contemporary examples of this
argument).
85 See notes 97-98 and accompanying text infra (noting contemporary examples of this
argument).
86 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
87 See id. at 286. In Cassell, the Court computed the number of African-American jurors
that would have appeared in the grand jury absent discrimination by examining the racial
composition of residents who had paid a poll tax. See id. at 285-87 (plurality opinion). Decades later, after the abolition of poll taxes, the Court in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
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defendant's challenge to this selection process reached the Supreme
Court and produced a fractured decision granting the defendant relief.

Writing for himself and two other Justices, Justice Frankfurter found
that the record demonstrated that the commissioners intended to limit

the number of African Americans on each grand jury to one and concluded that this constituted "purposeful, systematic non-inclusion be88
cause of color" in violation of the equal protection clause.
This phrase in Justice Frankfurter's opinion seemed to imply that
purposeful, systematic inclusion because of color would have been permissible. Judge John Brown, writing sixteen years later for a majority of
judges on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thought so. In Brooks v.

Beto, the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the VanZandt County,
Texas, jury commissioners to include two people on its list of sixteen
prospective grand jurors because they were African-American.8 9 Judge
Brown concluded that a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court had
never adopted "the proposition that consciously to include, but not
arbitrarily or proportionately to limit, transgresses constitutional demands." 90 Today, proponents of Hennepin County's plan to reserve at
least two spots for nonwhites on every capital grand jury cite Brooks to
defend their proposal under the equal protection clause, claiming that the

plan does not fix a maximum number of spots for nonwhite jurors but
merely designates two as a minimum. 91
But even if a reading of Cassell once permitted a distinction between
exclusive and inclusive race-based jury selection policies, 92 the distinction
(1977), calculated this figure by examining the racial composition of the adult population, not
the racial composition of those whom state law defines as eligible to vote or to serve as jurors.
See id. at 495.
88 Cassell, 339 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added).
89 366 F.2d 1, 8-9 (5th Cir. 1966) ("We must treat this case as one in which a substantial
element of a collective body purposely selected two members for the list for the reason, among
others, that they were Negroes.").
90 Id. at 21. The first paragraph of Judge Brown's lengthy opinion clearly states his position: "Unlike the other cases heard en banc, this one does not challenge the exclusion of
Negroes from grand or trial juries. Rather, this case seeking habeas from a Texas conviction
for rape complains of purposeful inclusion of Negroes in the grand jury returning the indictment." Id. at 4; see also United States v. Jenison, 485 F. Supp. 655, 666 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("It is
well recognized that purposeful inclusion of distinct classes on grand or petit juries does not
constitute discrimination violative of the federal constitution entitling an accused to relief in
the federal courts.").
91See Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 48; see also Berryhill v. State, 291
S.E.2d 685, 691 (Ga. 1982) (relying on Brooks in rejecting defendant's challenge to Georgia
county jury commission's practice of supplementing jury list with "target figure" of women
after determining that list would otherwise underrepresent women).
92 Arguably, the case suggested just the opposite. Justice Frankfurter's opinion stated elsewhere that "[t]he basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account." Cassell, 339
U.S. at 295 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Four concurring justices insisted that neither
exclusion nor inclusion on the basis of race is permissible. See id. at 287 (opinion of Reed, J.,
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lends little aid to modem proponents of race-conscious selection proce-

dures. For whenever the number of spots being filled is finite, the deliberate inclusion of one person entails the deliberate exclusion of someone

else. 93 Every minimum or "floor" for nonwhite jurors is a maximum or
94
"ceiling" for white jurors.

Indeed, what appears to have persuaded

Judge Brown to approve race-conscious jury selection in Brooks is not
the distinction between race-conscious jury selection practices that include and those that exclude, but the distinction between race-conscious

selection practices that limit white or majority representation and those
that limit African-American or minority representation.
This is one version of a position that proponents of affirmative ac-

tion have championed for years: the constitutionality of a racial classification depends, at least in part, upon the nature of its effect or the
identity of those affected. At least two generations of lawyers, judges,
academics, and legislators have, like Judge Brown, attempted to distinguish between benign uses of race which do not require constitutional
condemnation and invidious uses of race which do. Many of these theories would support lowered scrutiny for most of the race-conscious initiatives that I have described. For example, 95 racial jurymandering may be
with Vinson, C.J., Black and Clark, J.J., concurring) (stating that defendant is "entitled to
have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither
inclusion nor exclusion because of race"); id. at 297-98 (Clark, J., concurring)
("[R]epresentation on the grand jury by race in proportion to population is not permissible for
there must be 'neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race.' ").
Ultimately, these four justices based their finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination
on a different ground. After noting the commissioners' assertions that they did not include
more African Americans because they knew none who were qualified to be grand jurors, these
Justices found that the failure of the commissioners to "familiarize themselves fairly with the
qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color" denied the
defendant his constitutional rights. Id. at 287-90 (opinion of Reed, J., with Vinson, C.J., Black
and Clark, J.J., concurring); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 494, 510 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Frankfurter's opinion in Cassell); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487
(1953) ("Our Constitution requires that jurors be selected without inclusion or exclusion because of race. There must be neither limitation nor representation for color."); Cassell, 339
U.S. at 296-98 (Clark, J., concurring). But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
316-17 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that only exclusionary, not inclusionary, raceconscious measures violate equal protection).
93 See Recent Decisions, Conscious Inclusion of Negroes on Grand Jury Venire Is Not
Violative of Negro Defendant's Right to Equal Protection. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1966), 55 Geo. L.J. 942, 946 (1967) ("A system which includes jurors on the basis of race
necessarily excludes other jurors on the basis of race.").
94 Even Judge Brown warned that while jury commissioners have a duty to ensure a fair
representation of races on the jury, "this must never, simply never, be done as the means of
discrimination. It must never, simply never, be applied to secure proportional representation.
It must never, simply never, be applied to secure a predetermined or fixed limitation." Brooks,
366 F.2d at 24 (emphasis added).
95 I select these approaches as illustrations only. I do not mean to suggest that these theories are representative. As Professor Fiscus recently observed, so much has been written about
affirmative action that any attempt to cite the voluminous commentary seems "slightly prepos-
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justified in terms of distributive justice:96 those chosen or rejected for
jury service do not "lose" anything under plans that guarantee proportional racial representation 97 since each person's rightful opportunity to
be selected for jury service is defined and limited by the racial composition of the adult population.9 8 Stated another way, if the under-

representation of a minority group injury pools is traceable to some form
of racial discrimination against members of that group, restoring the
proper balance of opportunity among racial groups does not deprive ma-

jority or white jury candidates of anything to which they were morally,
politically, or constitutionally entitled. 99
Ely's classic process-based claim that "it is not 'suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority.., to discriminate against itself" 100 would
also support lowered scrutiny of most measures designed to enhance the
jury service opportunities for African Americans while impairing those
of whites.' 0 ' Other theorists have concluded that the equal protection
clause by design extends more protection to African Americans than to
other racial groups, 0 2 protects only groups that have been in a position
terous." Ronald J. Fiscus, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action 130 n.7 (1992).
96 See generally id.; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707
(1993).
97 See Letter from Sheri Lynn Johnson, supra note 7, at 3 ("The right is not bought at the
expense of other possibly blameless individuals; neither white defendants nor white grand jurors 'lose' anything.").
98 See Letter from Albert Alschuler, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that reserving two seats on
every grand jury for nonwhites "does not stigmatize or disadvantage people on the basis of
race at all"); Letter from Roy Brooks, supra note 7, at 3 ("Since the [Hennepin County] Task
Force's proposal does not subordinate whites-it is racially inclusive without subordinating
whites-it should survive constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.").
99 See, e.g., R. Fiscus, supra note 95, at 51 ("[P]roportional quotas... do not violate the
rights of any white individuals 'on account of their race' because they do not violate any rights
those individuals have unless they can be said to have the right to profit from society's racism."). Theories of justice based on group power or influence, rather than proportional presence, would support procedures such as the proposal in Kalamazoo, that seek to include a
greater percentage of minority jurors than that reflected in the adult population. See, e.g., Iris
Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 15-38 (1991).
1o John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev.
723, 727 (1974); see also id. at 735 ("When the group that controls the decisionmaking process
classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually
suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking.").
101 See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1807, 1843-45 (1993).
102 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action:
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. III. L. Rev. 1043, 1071-73 (justifying use of quotas
or proportional representation in affirmative action programs because "the experience of
blacks in American society is different than that of all other ethnic, racial, and religious groups
in American society"); cf. Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance: Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 485 (1991) (arguing for greater attention to expectations of framers of fourteenth amendment).
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of "perpetual subordination and circumscribed political power,"103 and
prohibits only "state action predicated on the view that one person is by
virtue of race inferior to another" 1 4 or which "impose[s] racial sub10 5
jugation."
Unfortunately for those who defend race-conscious selection policies, there is now little hope for these interpretations of the equal protection clause. For decades, the Court's badly split affirmative action opinions left open the possibility that it would eventually embrace one or
more of these theories and apply something short of strict scrutiny to

race-conscious efforts by government officials to rectify societal discrimination and enhance minority opportunities. In its decisions evaluating

racial preferences in employment, education, and voting, for example, no
majority position emerged concerning either the reasons to distinguish
between benign racial classifications and invidious ones or the standards
under which benign racial classifications should be judged. 1 6 Three re103 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 155
(1976); see also L. Jones, supra note 78, at 15 (noting that allocating extra jury seats to minorities is constitutional, since equal protection guarantees were intended to protect civil rights of
nonwhites from abuse by whites); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is ColorBlind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1991) ("[A] revised approach to race must recognize the systematic nature of subordination in American society .... [R]acial subordination is inherently
connected to other forms of subordination."); MacDougall, supra note 7, at 545 (noting that
argument that deliberately including African Americans on juries is racism in reverse "is a
particularly specious and pernicious one.... A white defendant, for example, does not have to
battle the court to have his race fairly represented on the jury; the juries are all white").
104 Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1030 (1979) (emphasis added).
105 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1336 (1986); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988) ("A more promising theme in equal protection doctrine
may well be an anti-subjugation principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally
reinforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060, 1116 (1991)
("Whether phrased as 'anti-caste,' 'anti-group disadvantage,' or 'anti-subjugation,' the task
remains where it began: the ending of second class status of an historically oppressed group
and the achieving of racial justice."). For another recent critique of the Court's color-blind
stance against affirmative action, see generally Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modem Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1991) (arguing that Court's hostility to minority racial preferences is inconsistent with political process theory and strict constructionism).
106 See generally Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution 182-224 (1992); Michael Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action and Justice 163 (1991); Jessie H. Choper, Continued Uncertainty
as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifications: Identifying the Pieces of the
Puzzle, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 255 (1987).
Indeed, the majority in Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), appeared to read the
Court's decisions correctly when it declared in 1966 that the Court had not yet precluded
affirmative action in jury selection. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text supra (analyzing
Brooks); see also Hugh Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand Juries, 3 Baylor L. Rev. 29,
39 (1950) (arguing that Cassell could not have meant that purposeful inclusion by race is
illegal but instead sought to distinguish between jury selection procedures that are designed to
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cent cases finally ended the suspense.

A majority of the Court is now as suspicious of racial classifications
that burden whites as it is of classifications that burden historically disadvantaged racial groups. In its 1989 decision in City of Richmond v. JA.

Croson Co. ,107 the Court refused to apply less than strict scrutiny to a
state-sponsored set-aside program purportedly designed to rectify the racially disparate effects of deliberate discrimination. It expressly rejected
arguments that "the level of scrutiny [should] var[y] according to the
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative
process," 10 8 and declared that "the standard of review under the equal
protection clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefitted by a particular classification."' 10 9 The Croson majority asserted that "there is simply no way" to tell which racial classifications are

"benign" and which are "illegitimate," absent the "searching judicial inquiry" strict scrutiny affords. 110
Three years later, the Court's decision in Georgia v. McCollum1 1 1
again suggested that it would apply its most rigorous equal protection
standards to attempts by any state or state actor to secure greater representation of minorities on juries by deliberately limiting jury service opportunities for whites. McCollum held that a white defendant who used
peremptory challenges to excuse African-American veniremembers violated the equal protection rights of those jurors.' 12 Stating that "[i]t is an
affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race," Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court implied that it would have been equally
intolerant of an African-American defendant's use of peremptory chal13
lenges to excuse white veniremembers.1
preserve discrimination and those that are designed to destroy it).
107 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
1os Id. at 495.
109 Id. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986)).
110 Id. at 493.
111112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
112 Id. at 2350.

113 Id. at 2358; see also id. at 2360 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t is
difficult to see how the result could be different if the defendants here were black."); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("IT]he minority
defendant can no longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as many jurors of his own
race as possible."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In
fact, it would constitute discrimination to exempt [one group] from the peremptory-strike exposure to which all others are subject."); State v. Carr, 427 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. 1993) (on
remand from Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of McCollum) (applying McCollum
and ordering African-American defendant to articulate race-neutral reason for removing
whites); State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803, 806 (La. 1992) (same); Gilchrest v. State, 627 A.2d 44,
53 (Md. 1993) (same); Griffin v. State, 610 So. 2d 354, 356 (Miss. 1992) (same); People v.
Yarbrough, 589 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that Batson applies to
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Finally, in its most recent equal protection decision, Shaw v.
Reno,114 the Court this past term reiterated its color-blind position.
Shaw declined to dismiss an equal protection challenge brought by white
plaintiffs to a congressional redistricting plan that created two districts
containing a majority of African-American voters. Relying on Croson,

the Shaw majority rejected the dissenters' arguments that the constitutionality of a racial classification depends on whether or not it burdens or
benefits the racial minority.'1 5 In short, any distinction the Court once
may have made between racially inclusive and racially exclusive policies
has vanished.
African-American defendant's peremptory challenges); People v. Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d 986,
998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (same); cf. Echlin v. LeCureux, 995 F.2d 1344, 1356 (6th Cir.)
(Ryan, C.J., dissenting) ("Exclusion of a potential juror simply because he is white is no less
racial discrimination than exclusion of a juror simply because he is black.... It is difficult to
see any distinction in terms of degrees of harm to defendant, jurors, or the community if the
racial roles are reversed... or if the group discriminated against happens to hold a majority
position in the community."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 552 (1993).
114 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
115 See id. at 2829. Interestingly, the Court's refusal to extend more protection to African
Americans than to whites lessens the importance of one dispute between supporters and opponents of race-conscious jury selection. At least one opponent has claimed that selection systems that preference African Americans actually disproportionately burden African Americans, not whites, since most citizens regard jury service as something to avoid, not covet. See
Kull, supra note 7, at 20 (noting "burden on black voters" imposed by Georgia system).
There is some merit to this appraisal. Jury service is compelled, not optional. Citizens
are required by law to return their questionnaires, and they are summoned to serve under
penalty of contempt. Studies show that citizens sometimes refuse to register to vote or to
respond to questionnaires in hopes of evading a jury summons, see note 15 supra (citing study),
and that the trauma experienced by some jurors in judging gruesome or violent criminal cases
may last a lifetime. See generally Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn Winget, The Occupational
Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 325 (1992); Marjorie 0. Dobbs,
Note, Jury Traumatization in High Profile Criminal Trials: A Case For Crisis Debriefing?, 16
Law & Psych. Rev. 201 (1992). The costs of jury service make it look to many less like a
privilege one fights for-such as the vote, an education, or a good job-and more like a hardship one might prefer not to undergo-like combat duty or paying taxes. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting burdens of jury service
and comparing jury selection to conscripting armies); Deirdre Golash, Race, Fairness, and
Jury Selection, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 155, 167 (1986) (comparing jury service to combat duty);
Cynthia Penney, Who-Me?, N.Y. Mag., Sept. 16, 1991, at 64, 64-65 (explaining how one
might get out of jury duty); Stephen Knack, Deterring Voter Registration Through Juror
Source Practices: Evidence from the 1991 NES Pilot Study 8 (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that 35% of over 700 respondents
who were asked "If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you be happy to do it or would
you rather not serve?" preferred not to serve).
On the other hand, evidence also suggests that most people view jury service as a privilege; that evidence includes a century of litigation by minorities and then women to obtain the
right to serve. See, e.g., note 142 infra (listing civil cases). I believe that it does matter for
equal protection purposes whose ox is gored by racial preferences in jury selection and that
those excluded from jury service because of their race suffer greater harm than those included
because of their race.
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2. Societal Harm and the Irrelevance of Group or Individual Injury
Shaw, McCollum, and Croson also suggest that the Court will not be
persuaded by claims like that made recently by the Georgia Supreme

Court: that race-conscious jury selection policies preserve rather than
skew group opportunities and are therefore less objectionable than other

racial preferences. 1 6 In Meders v. State, that court reasoned that the
procedure used by Georgia's county jury commissioners to "balance the

box" should be exempt from heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause because it only duplicates the racial representation of the
community and the source lists and thus does not give any group a dis17
tinct advantage over any other group.'

Although this position is consistent with the distributive justice theories described earlier, from the Supreme Court's present perspective it is
all wrong. The first problem with this argument is that it elevates group

rights above the rights of individuals,11 8 since all uses of race in jury
selection burden individuals on the basis of their race to some degree.

Even if the proportion of whites and nonwhites selected through such
methods is exactly the same as their proportions in the source poolpreserving existing group opportunity-these techniques still condition
the opportunities of some individuals to serve according to their race.
The Hennepin proposal, for instance, which guarantees proportionate
See Meders v. State, 389 S.E.2d 320, 323 & n.2 (Ga. 1990).
117 Id. at 324 n.2. The court explained:
Assume a jury list of 1,000 persons, of whom 80% are white and 20% are black. If the
computer is instructed randomly to select one hundred persons for a jury venire, then
the odds that any one person is selected are 100/1000 or 1 in 10. If the list is broken
down into two groups, one composed of 800 whites and the other of 200 blacks, and the
computer randomly selects 80 of 800 and 20 of the 200 (which, in essence, is what
happens in Glynn County), then a white person on the list has 80 chances in 800-or 1
in 10-of being selected, while a black person has 20 chances in 200-or I in 10-of
being selected.
Id.; see also id. at 326 (Benham, J., concurring) ("[TJhe venire selection process utilized here is
race neutral in that it does not give any group a distinct advantage over any other group....
Unlike [Croson].... the process here neither benefits nor burdens any particular class of
citizens; therefore, where no preferential treatment is given, there is no need for a heightened
scrutiny. .. ") (emphasis added).
It is, of course, doubtful that in every Georgia county this race-conscious selection system
reproduces exactly the racial proportions of each preceding pool of names. Thus, racial groups
are disparately burdened in those counties in which the selection system "improves" the ratio
between African Americans and whites beyond that in the voter registration lists. The proposal of the Kalamazoo task force is another example of a race-conscious selection policy that
imposes group burdens. The proposal recommends nearly tripling the percentage of minorities
in the population for jury venires, see Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at 13-14 (recommending 25% minority representation in trial jury venires in county with about 9% minority
adult population), a method that would make it three times more likely that any minority race
person on the source list will be chosen for jury service than any white person on the list.
118 See Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4852 (1976) (rejecting notion of group rights).
116
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representation of nonwhites in capital grand juries, offers the clearest example of this. If the first twenty-one grand jurors selected are white,
then the court must choose nonwhite veniremembers for the last two positions. At that point, the proposal increases the chances that remaining
nonwhite veniremembers will be selected, but it eliminates any chance
that remaining white veniremembers will be selected. ' 9
Race-conscious measures adopted earlier in the selection process
have similar effects. For example, supplementing source lists with the
names of African Americans who have not registered to vote while
not adding the names of unregistered whites creates disparate burdens
among similarly situated individuals because of their race. The oversampling of groups that are underrepresented on voter registration lists
may mean that the length of time between jury summonses for members
of those groups is shorter than the interval between jury summonses for
members of groups that are overrepresented on voter registration lists.
One could even characterize a judge's consideration of race when choosing a trial venue as discrimination against racial groups or group members. If one assumes that all the eligible jurors in each potential
destination venue have a right to be considered for jury service in the
case being moved regardless of race, race-conscious venue selection violates the rights of each potential juror in those alternative venues. 120
119 See Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 45; see also Oscar Boswell, Casenote,
Constitutional Law-Selection of State Grand Juries-Deliberate Inclusion of Negroes, 41
Tul. L. Rev. 473, 478-79 (1967) (criticizing purposeful inclusion in grand juries upheld in
Brooks on ground that "a potential juror excluded from a venire because his race was already
proportionately represented could argue that his exclusion violated his right to equal protection as an individual").
120 Compare Gilbert, supra note 7, at 1941 (defending constitutionality of proposals to consider race when choosing trial venues because they "are not affirmative inclusion measures...
[but] merely mechanisms seeking to prevent an imbalance that would be created by a decision
that would ordinarily not be made") with commentators claiming that venue change decisions
implicate the equal protection rights of potential jurors in rejected destinations, e.g., Lisa E.
Alexander, Vicinage, Venue, and Community Cross-Section: Obstacles to a State Defendant's
Right to a Trial by a Representative Jury, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261, 287 (1991) (stating
that venue change decisions which decrease available pool of minority jurors "discriminate[ ]
against members of minority-dense communities by preventing participation in the judicial
process" because "'[t]he vicinage right belongs to the community as well as to the accused' ")
(alteration in original) (quoting People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917, 929 (Cal. 1989)); Out of the
Frying Pan, supra note 7, at 718 (arguing that in some circumstances, venue change is "identical to one massive peremptory strike against minority jurors" and suggesting prosecutor
should have standing to challenge equal protection injury to potential jurors).
Still, decisions to change trial venues may be distinguishable from the other selection
procedures described here. Potential jurors may have no constitutionally protected interest as
to where trials take place. The Constitution and statutes grant each defendant rights to a
certain vicinage; some have suggested those guarantees also create rights in the community or
the government. But individual jurors, such as those residents of Oakland County passed over
by the judge who moved the Rodney King beating case to Ventura County, would seem to
have no constitutionally protected interest here. A person's interest in being selected for jury
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There is, however, an even deeper conflict between the Court's most
recent decisions and the argument that racial jurymandering raises no
equal protection concerns because it creates no disparate burdens for individuals or groups. For the Court, the "societal injury" created by the
government's use of race to design juries-even without discernable effects on the opportunities of individuals or groups-is probably sufficient
to trigger close scrutiny. In Shaw, the Court relied entirely on the potential threat of such systemic harm to justify its application of strict
scrutiny to racially gerrymandered African-American-majority voting
districts. The Court was unconcerned that the plaintiffs had failed even
to allege that their opportunity to participate in the political processeither as individuals or as whites-had been in any way impaired by the
redistricting plan, rejecting the arguments of dissenting Justices that redistricting with race in mind violates the equal protection clause only if it
diminishes or dilutes a racial group's political strength. 121 It apparently
found such allegations unnecessary and instead declared "cognizable"
two other "harms" created by "racial gerrymandering":1 22 the reinforcement of racial stereotypes and the threat to representative democracy
posed by racial partisanship.12 3 "Classifications of citizens solely on the
service in criminal and civil cases already placed in their community is at least more weighty
than any interest they have in the placement of trials that might be moved there.
121 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993). Justice White argued in his dissent that
absent claims that the redistricting plan had "the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their
influence on the political process," a racial group cannot claim a cognizable constitutional
injury. Id. at 2834. "[T]he issue is whether the classification... discriminates against anyone
by denying equal access to the political process." Id. at 2836 (White, J.,
dissenting). Also
dissenting, Justice Blackmun explained that "[t]he conscious use of race in redistricting does
not violate the equal protection clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a
particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly." Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion contended:
The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to
do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but
whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting
process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal
distribution of electoral power. When an assumption that.., a minority group.., will
vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs.
Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also agreed:
[T]he mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a
right or benefit provided to others.... [B]ecause the legitimate consideration of race in a
districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities
are racially mixed ....and because without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual
standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions.... [A] gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm.
Id. at 2846-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2828 (O'Connor, J., for the Court).
123 [R]eapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces
racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy
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basis of race 'are by their very nature odious,' "124 the Court wrote, and
"'serve to stimulate our society's latent race-consciousness.' "125 The
Court continued:
"When racial or religious lines are drawn by the state, the multiracial,
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to
religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek
not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan.
Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find no
126
footing here."
"Indeed," the Court declared, "racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. 91 27 The Court's message is clear: "Racial classifications of any sort
1 28
pose the risk of lasting harm to our society."
by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than
their constituency as a whole.... Justice Souter does not adequately explain why these
harms are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
Id. at 2824 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 329 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
Id. at 2825 (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part)).
126 Id. at 2827-28 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (terming "prophetic" Alexander Bickel's statement that a racial quota is "a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base, especially in a
society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant").
Indeed, the rhetoric of Shaw has called into question the constitutionality of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act itself, see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 639; Richard H. Pildes
& Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 495-96 (1993), but
these implications are beyond the scope of this Article.
127 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829. In Powers v. Ohio, a recent jury selection case, the Court
expressed a similar view about peremptory challenges:
We reject as well the view that race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection scrutiny because members of all races are subject to like treatment, which is to
say that white jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race
as are all other jurors.... It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree.
499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
128 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (emphasis added). In contrast to Shaw, a majority of Justices
in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey examined a race-conscious redistricting plan and
stated:
There is no doubt that.., the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But
its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and
we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any abridgment of the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977). For more on the nature of the new equal protection injury recognized in Shaw, see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 609 (suggesting that Shaw prohibits "'excessive' use of race"); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 126, at 506-07 (stating that Shaw was
124
125

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1993]

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION

Given these sweeping statements, and the many parallels between
juries and legislatures, 129 it would be no stretch for the Court to conclude
that using race to select juries creates similar harms. The Court has already observed that race-based peremptory challenges corrode public respect for and confidence in criminal proceedings. 130 The same Court
appears poised to conclude that, like a legislature's use of race to create
voting districts, even less overt uses of race in selecting jurors would "reinforce[ ] the perception that members of the same racial group . . .
think alike" 13 1 and would undermine our "progress as a multiracial
132
democracy."
In sum, after Shaw, the absence of any discernible effect on individual or group opportunity will not shield race-conscious jury selection
procedures from the strictest scrutiny. Those who litigate the constitutionality of these initiatives will face a Court that is unlikely to peek from
behind its recently reinforced color-blinders. State and local 133 efforts to
concerned with "expressive harms").
129 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1187-89
(1991) (exploring connections between juries and legislatures); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:
The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413, 1430 n.62, 1485-86 (1991)
(drawing analogies between rights protected by Voting Rights Act and jury service rights);
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 725, 749-50 (1992) (characterizing electorate and jury as central
institutions of representative government). It may very well be that the Court's concern about
racial partisanship and its consequences for deliberation make the jury context the only logical
subject, other than elections, of Shaw's societal harm theory.
130 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353-54 (1992) (noting harms to society and
justice system when race discrimination occurs during voir dire).
131 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990)). In
Holland, Justice Stevens noted in dissent:
[A] juror selected [by a computer selecting a mathematically correct number of members
of demographic groups] might feel that she or he is filling some predetermined "slot"
and might attempt to give the view generally associated with those demographic characteristics rather than the juror's personal feelings about the case. The jurors might find it
harder to work together as a group because they may be more conscious of their identified differences than the much stronger common bonds that unite them as people.
493 U.S. at 512-13 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 18 (1977)). Other judges share these sentiments. See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court,
781 P.2d 537, 544 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring) ("[H]eightened race consciousness
and utilization of criteria preferring one race over another, no matter how well intentioned,
will in the long run be counterproductive to the common goal [of a color-blind society] and
will tend to perpetuate racial bias and hostility.").
132 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
133 The Court might evaluate federal congressional efforts differently, however. In the
Court's most recent effort to consider the constitutionality of a federal race-conscious program
designed to enhance minority opportunity, a narrow majority-including the now absent Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall-applied a less stringent standard, reasoning that the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause does not require strict
scrutiny of congressionally crafted race-conscious measures. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of minority preference programs adopted by FCC). Alternatively, the Court could in the future apply lesser scrutiny to
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increase minority participation in juries must now withstand the same
strict scrutiny that would be applied to governmental racial classifications intended to bar minority group members from jury service entirely.
The following Sections consider how challenges to affirmative selection
procedures may be raised and how they might fare in light of the sentiments expressed in Shaw and Croson.
B.

Standing to Raise Equal Protection Challenges
to Race-Conscious Jury Selection Procedures

In its recent efforts to rein in both race-based peremptory challenges
and the use of racial preferences in nonjury contexts, the Supreme Court
has relaxed the showing of harm required of a complainant in order to
establish standing to challenge such practices under the equal protection
clause. These decisions have lengthened the list of potential challengers
to racial preferences in jury selection, making these preferences more vulnerable to attack.
In Powers v. Ohio, the Court held that any criminal defendant may
raise the equal protection rights of veniremembers excluded by a prosecutor's race-based peremptory challenges, whether or not the defendant
shares the race of those excluded.13 4 The Court concluded that a peremptory challenge based on race causes a defendant to suffer an injury in
fact, that the possibility of postconviction relief makes the defendant an
effective proponent of the excluded veniremember's rights, and that the
135
excluded veniremember is not likely to assert those rights herself.
Powers eliminated the earlier requirement that a defendant challenging intentional discrimination must share the race of the target of discrimination in order to secure relief. 13 6 Now any defendant may seek
relief from an indictment or a conviction in order to vindicate the rights
of those excluded because of their race. The injury suffered by a defendant when race is used in jury selection is the same whether it takes place
during early or late stages of selection, so long as the sorting has the
race-conscious congressional measures that are authorized by § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 563 (stating courts must grant "'appropriate deference'" to Congress when it employs its powers under fourteenth amendment (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980))); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (noting that § 5 grants Congress power to achieve equal protection mandates); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (holding that § 5 is an adequate basis for justifying congressionally mandated minority set-aside programs for government contracts). None of the
initiatives discussed in this Article meet either of these criteria for relaxed scrutiny.
134 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
135 See id. at 411-15.
136 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (noting this requirement); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 (1977) (same).
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potential to affect the racial composition of the resulting jury.13 7 Regardless of the phase at which jury discrimination occurs, those excluded
from jury service seem just as unlikely to seek redress for their own
rights, and the defendant just as likely to be a strong advocate for relief.13 8 As a result, lawmakers adopting race-conscious selection practices at any stage-even in the earliest stages such as venue selection or
the selection of source lists-can now expect to litigate the constitutionality of these practices in post-conviction proceedings.
The Court also recently relaxed its standing requirements for plaintiffs who challenge race-conscious remedies in civil suits, making it easier
for jury-eligible residents to bring equal protection claims. 139 This past
term, in NortheasternFloridaChapterof the Associated General Contrac137 Some of the language in Powers, however, leaves the Court the option of limiting the
"actual injury" doctrine to discrimination during voir dire:
Unlike the instances where a defendant seeks to object to the introduction of evidence obtained illegally from a third party, ... the primary constitutional violation
occurred during the trial itself. A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a racebased peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the
outset of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts
doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the
law throughout the trial of the cause. The voir dire phase of the trial represents the
'Yurors'first introduction to the substantivefactualand legal issues in a case." The influence of the voir dire process may persist through the whole course of the trial
proceedings.
499 U.S. at 412 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Later the Court noted that the excluded
juror and defendant have an interest in eliminating racial discrimination "from the courtroom." Id. at 413; see also Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1246 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane)
(Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that trial judge's efforts to pick racially balanced grand jury did
not deny defendant's equal protection rights, nor did defendant have standing to raise any
violation of jurors' rights to equal protection), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
For other standing cases with interesting implications for defendants' jury challenges, see
United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611, 615 n.7 (2d Cir.) (granting
standing to grand jury witness, who was fighting contempt for failing to testify, to challenge
composition of grand jury list), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971); Mississippi State Bar v.
Blackmon, 600 So. 2d 166, 178-79 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J., dissenting) (arguing that attorney
who can prove race discrimination in selection of Committee on Professional Responsibility is
entitled to relief from "any charge of misconduct originating with that committee"); see also
David Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analysis, and a Case
Study, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 771, 783-85 (1972) ("Grand jury witnesses, who may also be
potential defendants, are, therefore, within the class sought to be protected by constitutional
requirements concerning composition.").
138 But see Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (noting that barriers to suit by jurors excluded during
peremptory challenges are higher than those excluded by "systematic practices of the jury
clerk and commissioners," because excluded veniremember would have difficulty showing
"likelihood that discrimination against him at the voir dire stage will recur" (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983))).
139 As the Court stated in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970): "People excluded
from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries
chosen under a system of racial exclusion." Id. at 329.
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tors of America v. City of Jacksonville,14 0 the Court held that an association of primarily white-owned construction contractors and firms had

standing to challenge a city's set-aside program for minority-owned businesses, despite the association's inability to prove that without the program one or more of its members would have been awarded a contract.

The Court reasoned that in order to show "injury in fact" sufficient to
raise an equal protection challenge, a plaintiff need only show a "denial
of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the

ultimate inability to obtain the benefit."1 41

The implications of NortheasternFloridafor jury selection litigation

are significant. So far, only minority groups have used civil suits to enjoin jury selection practices that are racially discriminatory. 142 But the

Court's decisions signal that white citizens who feel strongly enough
about color-blind values to challenge selection practices that advantage

minorities will be able to litigate the constitutionality of those practices in
civil cases. 143 Just as white voters in Shaw were able to claim that racial
gerrymandering violated their constitutional right to participate in a
"color-blind" electoral process, 44 so too can potential jurors claim that
racial jurymandering violates their right to participate in a "color-blind"
140 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2304-05 (1993).
141 Id. at 2303.

142 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1970) (alleging discrimination against African Americans); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 322 (1970) (same); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleging exclusion of African Americans and
women); Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d
807, 810 (5th Cir. 1980) (alleging exclusion of Americans of Mexican descent, women, young
people, and poor people), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981); Porter v. Freeman, 577 F.2d 329,
330 (5th Cir. 1978) (alleging discrimination against African Americans and women); Berry v.
Cooper, 577 F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 805 (5th
Cir. 1975) (same); Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1969) (alleging discrimination
against African Americans); Pullum v. Greene, 396 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1968) (same);
Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841
(1966); Newsom v. Daley, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2869, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (same); Mann v.
Cox, 487 F. Supp. 147, 149 (S.D. Ga. 1979) (same); Quandra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp.
605, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (challenging systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities, women,
lower income persons, and young adults); Jewell v. Stebbins, 288 F. Supp. 600, 601 (E.D. Ark.
1968) (challenging exclusion of African Americans); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 402
(M.D. Ala. 1966) (alleging exclusion of African Americans and women); Mitchell v. Johnson,
250 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (challenging exclusion of African Americans). But see
Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d 321, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that white plaintiff needed to
show "systematic exclusion on the basis of race or some other ground forbidden by national
policy" in order to have federal cause of action).
143 Cf. Gilbert, supra note 7, at 1933 (proposing that when venue change decisions result in
disproportionate underrepresentation of racial group in comparison with that group's representation in the county of origin, prosecutor should have standing to raise rights of jurors
belonging to that group, and implying that excluded jurors may bring their own challenge).
144 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993); see also Hines v. Mayor of Ahoskie, 998
F.2d 1266, 1274 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that district court properly rejected proposed districting plan because plan would violate equal protection rights of white voters).
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jury system.
C. Applying Strict Scrutiny After Shaw and Croson:
A Bleak Forecastfor Race-ConsciousJury Selection
At the same time that the Court has made it easier for complainants
to challenge alffrmative action in jury selection, it has made defending
these practices more difficult by limiting the theories under which these
measures might survive strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, a selection
process that considers race violates the equal protection clause unless the
measure is narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to advance a compelling interest. 145 Although lawmakers who adopt race-conscious selection practices may be able to show that their reasons for adopting such
techniques are compelling, few, if any, will be able to demonstrate to the
present Court the requisite relationship between their objectives and the
race-based methods they have chosen.
1.

Identifying a Compelling Interest

a. Remedying Intentional Discrimination and Preventing Sixth
Amendment Violations. For the Court, eliminating intentional race discrimination and its effects is a sufficiently important reason to justify the
use of racial classifications. 146 Some jurisdictions may be able to show
that this was indeed their purpose for adopting race-conscious measures
by producing a "strong basis in evidence" 14 7 of past or continuing intentional racial discrimination during the jury selection process. 14 8 Jurisdictions that have traditionally delegated jury selection to the discretion of
selectors, for instance, should be able to establish proof of past intentional discrimination simply by pointing to a prior judicial finding of discrimination or to one or more instances where a discretionary selection

system has produced unrepresentative juries or jury pools. 149 However,
See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824, 2831.
146 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-507 (1989) (suggesting that
allocation of public contracts on basis of race may be justified with adequate evidence of identified discrimination).
147 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (finding that there was no
evidence of intentional discrimination "approaching a prima facie case").
148 A state may establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in one of two ways:
(1) by proving that the jury selection system creates an opportunity to discriminate on the
basis of race and that the underrepresentation of minorities has resulted from that system; or
(2) by showing that the selection process has resulted in substantial underrepresentation of
minorities for a significant period of time. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-94
(1977) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (discussing how defendant in
criminal case can establish prima facie proof of discrimination in jury selection)).
149 See, e.g., People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 193-94 (Colo. 1993) (holding that defendant's
proof that number of otherwise qualified Spanish-surnamed potential jurors were excluded by
judge from grand jury venire, combined with proof that judge had opportunity to discriminate,
145
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racial preferences in jury selection systems that are primarily random are
not likely to be designed to remedy past or continuing intentional discrimination. 150 Alternative "compelling interests" must be found to justify these practices if they are to survive strict scrutiny.15 1
established prima facie case of intentional discrimination, even without showing of historical
pattern of abuse); Crenshaw, supra note 62, at 215-16 (describing judicial order-entered after
court found that former selection system violated equal protection-mandating that racial
composition of qualified list approximate racial composition of population).
150 Intentional discrimination in less discretionary systems would have to be demonstrated,
if at all, by proof that lawmakers chose to perpetuate the underrepresentation of minority
jurors by deliberately preserving ostensibly racially neutral criteria that screen out disproportionately more African Americans than whites. Cf. Kairys et al., supra note 37, at 815 ("The
choice of which list or lists will be utilized, whether made by a legislature, by a court, or by
selection officials, is an intentional act, and any resulting discrimination is systematic.").
Although some lower courts continue to claim this method of proving intentional discrimination is available, see Jefferson v. Morgan, 962 F.2d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
showing that defendant's race was underrepresented "on numerous grand juries over a significant period of time" raises "an inference that the state discriminated in selecting [the defendant's] particular grand jury"), I have not found a single case in which a court concluded that
the defendant established intentional discrimination through proof of even protracted and significant unrepresentative effects alone; all have required, in addition, some proof that jury
selectors had the opportunity to discriminate on the basis of race.
151 A majority of the Justices now on the Court has never declared that the only reason that
will justify a State's use of racial classifications is discrimination itself, although the Court's
opinion in Croson appeared to endorse this limitation. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (holding
municipality's failure to show "identified [local] discrimination" undermined its claim to have
"compelling interest" for using racial classifications). Justice O'Connor's opinion (endorsed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy), see id. at 510-i1 (emphasizing
need for strong showing of identified local discrimination), as well as Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, see id. at 524 (asserting that states can use racial classifications only where "necessary to eliminate" prior official discrimination), suggest this also. Sorting out the votes on
this point is a tricky business-given the 15 or so separate opinions in the Court's three most
recent affirmative action decisions and the replacement of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White-but the possibility that a majority will recognize alternative "compelling" interests
remains.
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg would probably consider interests other than
that of remedying past intentional discrimination "compelling" for purposes of strict scrutiny.
See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., dissenting) ("I
have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest."); Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 n.15 (1990) (opinion of
the Court, joined by Blackmun, J.) (noting possibility that other interests, including promoting
racial diversity in higher education, may justify the use of affirmative action policies); Croson,
488 U.S. at 512 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I would
not totally discount the legitimacy of race-based decisions that may produce tangible and fully
justified future benefits."); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Stevens in Croson "that
remedy for past wrong is not the exclusive basis upon which racial classifications may be justified"). Justice Souter's views on this subject appear only in Shaw, where he maintained that
compliance with the Voting Rights Act justifies most racial classifications in redistricting
under strict scrutiny. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2848 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and O'Connor have recently hinted that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act would offer a compelling justification which would permit racial classifications narrowly
tailored to that goal. See id. at 2831-32; id. at 2842 (White J., dissenting) (noting that major-
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One such interest may be the goal of ensuring the defendant's sixth
amendment right "'to a jury drawn from a venire constituting a fair
cross section of the community.' "152 The sixth amendment imposes an
affirmative duty to cure policies that result in underrepresentation of cognizable groups, unless those policies "manifestly and primarily" advance
a significant state interest. 5 3 This express constitutional prohibition
against systematic discrimination makes the government's interest in securing jury representativeness more important than its interest in, for
example, promoting a "diversity of viewpoints" in broadcasting-a goal
that several Justices recently termed "illegitimate" and "insubstantial."1' 54

Compliance with the sixth amendment's mandate of representative
jury pools is also a more "specific and verifiable" objective than the general goal of remedying "societal discrimination," a purpose that a majority of Justices view as too "amorphous" to justify racial classifications. 155
ity "seemingly agree[s]" that Voting Rights Act compliance is compelling state interest). Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's statement of this position in Shaw. See id. at 2819.
Justice Scalia, however, remains opposed to the use of race by states except when "necessary to
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification," Croson, 488
U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J.,concurring), or to respond to "imminent danger to life and limb [such
as] a prison race riot," id. at 521.
For a pre-Shaw vote-counting effort on this question, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The
Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 325,
366-67 n.159 (1992) (predicting that Justices Blackmun and Stevens would permit race-conscious admission policies; Justices Kennedy, Scalia, White, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist would oppose such policies; Justice O'Connor would more than likely oppose them; and
Justice Souter could vote either way). Lower courts since Croson have nearly always assumed
that only the goal of remedying past racial discrimination will justify racial preferences. See,
e.g., Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1403 (1 lth Cir. 1991) ("The Constitution requires some showing of prior discrimination by the public employer to justify the
use of race-preferential measures."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Milwaukee County
Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 421-22 (7th Cir.) (stating that majority of Justices on
Supreme Court would not employ racial classifications except to provide remedy for past discrimination), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991); Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917
F.2d 431,437 (10th Cir. 1990) (assuming that purpose of race-conscious affirmative action is to
address past wrongs against disadvantaged groups). But see Hayes v. City of Charlotte, 10
F.3d 207, 213 (4th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether promoting public respect for police
is compelling interest that might justify race-based promotion decisions in police department).
152 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (recognizing cross-section right, but refusing to extend it to the voir dire stage of jury selection) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 526 (1975)).
153 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979); see id. at 363-64 (" '[J]ury wheels, pools of
names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.' " (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538)). The right operates like equal protection might without the
intent requirement. A prima facie showing of a sixth amendment violation can be established
with statistics and is not rebuttable by proof of lack of deliberate discrimination.
154 Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 613 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia
and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting).
155 Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (rejecting societal discrimination as " 'too amorphous a basis for
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Because the Court has consistently circumscribed the scope of the crosssection guarantee, selection reforms intended to comply with the sixth
amendment would support only "limited and carefully defined uses of
racial classifications." 156 Specifically, a challenged reform would qualify
as "remedial" only if existing procedures significantly underrepresented
the preferenced racial group 157 and, in addition, did not "manifestly and
imposing a racially classified remedy"' (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986))).
In Metro Broadcasting,Justice O'Connor emphasized:
"[A]ttempt[s] to alleviate effects of societal discrimination" . . would allow "remedies
that are ageless in their reach into the past and timeless in their ability to affect the
future" ... [and] would allow distribution of goods essentially according to the demographic representation of particular racial and ethnic groups.... [Such attempts] would
support indefinite use of racial classifications... first to obtain the appropriate mixture
of racial views and then to ensure ... that mixture.
497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986)).
156 Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 613 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (noting that to establish prima facie violation of cross-section
guarantee of sixth amendment defendant must show that representation of "distinctive" group
in venires from which juries are selected is not "fair and reasonable" in relation to proportion
of such persons in community). Despite scores of cases litigated on this topic, however, courts
continue to debate what type of statistical analysis defendants may use to show either the
absence of "fair" representation under the sixth amendment or "substantial underrepresentation" for equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Floyd v. Garrison, 996 F.2d 947, 950 (8th Cir.
1993) (rejecting comparative disparity analysis in favor of absolute disparity analysis); see also
generally David C. Baldus & J. Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination (1980) (discussing use
and interpretation of statistical proofs in discrimination cases); Sara Sun Beale, Integrating
Statistical Evidence and Legal Theory to Challenge the Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors, 46
Law & Contemp. Probs. 269 (1983) (discussing use of statistical evidence in challenging jury
selection); Kairys et al., supra note 37, at 796-97 (recommending that comparative disparity of
15% be adopted as statistical threshold for prima facie case of illegal underrepresentation);
D.H. Kaye, Statistical Analysis in Jury Discrimination Cases, 25 Jurimetrics J. 274 (1985)
(discussing use of statistical evidence in challenging jury selection). Also, the magnitude and
regularity of underrepresentation necessary to qualify as "unfair" is not entirely certain. No
consensus appears, for instance, on whether the statistical level of underrepresentation necessary for a prima facie case is the same for both equal protection and cross-section violations.
See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that absolute disparity
of 12% came close to, but did not violate, cross-section requirement). Some courts have held
that absolute disparities as low as 5% and comparative disparities as low as 43% were sufficiently underrepresentative, while other courts have found that absolute disparities less than
10% and comparative disparities as high as 63% were not. See United States v. Maskeny, 609
F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir.) (requiring showing of more than 10% absolute disparity), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 921 (1980); Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (finding 5% absolute disparity sufficient); In re Rhymes, 217 Cal. Rptr. 439, 441-42, 445 (Cal. App. 2d 1985)
(finding comparative disparity of 43% sufficient); State v. Castonguay, 481 A.2d 56, 64 (Conn.
1984) (finding no underrepresentation where comparative disparity was 63%). Courts also
disagree about when and for how long the disparity must exist. Compare Atwell v. Blackburn,
800 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring defendant to demonstrate underrepresentation in
her particular venire), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920 (1987) with Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d
1395, 1399 (8th Cir.) (requiring proof of sustained underrepresentation and finding that evidence of underrepresentation on single venire panel cannot demonstrate systematic exclusion),
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primarily" advance a "significant state interest."15 8 Furthermore, the
Court has explained that the cross-section requirement does not apply to
the selection of trial jurors from the venire, so it could never justify racial
consideration at that phase of jury selection.1 59 A state would also have
difficulty prevailing with the argument that the cross-section requirement
justifies taking race into account when changing venues,16 0 or when secert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
158 Duren, 439 U.S. at 357, 367 (finding that blanket exemption from jury service for
women is not tailored closely enough to state's "important" interest in assuring that those
members of family responsible for care of children are available to do so); see also Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990) (holding that sixth amendment allows prosecutor to rely
on "legitimate" state interests to exclude groups at voir dire stage); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975) (rejecting argument that automatic exception for women furthers
state's interest in family stability).
159 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (finding no requirement that juries
actually chosen reflect cross-section of community); Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 n.20 (same); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (same). The majority in Holland most recently explained its refusal to
extend the cross-section right to the petit jury. Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing each side
to remove members of racial groups actually furthers the central purpose of the sixth amendment--obtaining an unbiased and impartial jury. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 481.
160 The sixth amendment guarantees only a trial by an impartial jury "of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Thus, most
courts have concluded that there can be no sixth amendment cross-section violation so long as
a case is transferred within a federal district and the jury is drawn from a cross-section of that
vicinage. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547, 550 (Cal. 1989) (holding
vicinage requirement is satisfied when defendant is tried in county which encompasses location
of crime), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3222 (1990); Williams v. Superior Court, 781 P.2d 537, 54041 (Cal. 1989) (holding that sixth amendment places no limitations on state legislative decisions to define judicial districts and that such districts contain relevant community for sixth
amendment purposes). Nor is there any sixth amendment injury if a defendant waives his
right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community in which the crime was committed
by moving for a change of venue. In order for a venue change to raise sixth amendment crosssection concerns, one must conclude either (1) that the community that must be cross-sectioned is not the entire federal district in which the crime was committed, but a more specific
area, compare Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902-04 (Alaska 1971) (finding that community
from which prospective jurors are drawn must include community in which crime was committed) and Mareska v. State, 534 N.E.2d 246, 248-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that while
city court could exercise county-wide jurisdiction, jury consisting of only city residents violated cross-section requirement when crime occurred outside city) with United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding there was no sixth amendment
right to venue change from Anchorage to Juneau when charged crime occurred few miles from
Juneau but 570 miles from Anchorage, since both cities are within same federal judicial district); or (2) that the cross-section right guarantees a particular mix of potential jurors no
matter where the trial is moved, see People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. 1976)
(noting in dicta that "within reasonable limits, the community to which the trial is transferred
should reflect the character of the county where the crime was committed"); Alexander, supra
note 120, at 292 (discussing proposal which would uphold jury pool not drawn from entire
vicinage if it fairly represented vicinage as whole). In addition, one must conclude that a
defendant who seeks a new venue does not waive either of these protections. Cf. Scott Kafker,
Note, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury: Resolving the Conflict in the
Federal Constitution, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729, 735-38 (1985) (discussing waiver issue and noting case in which federal district court chose to dismiss case rather than require defendant to

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:707

lecting grand juries and grand jury forepersons.1 6 1
These limits on the scope of the defendant's right under the sixth
amendment may make the goal of protecting that right sufficiently unambiguous to qualify as "compelling." However, such judicial constraints also limit the ability of officials to prove that compliance with the
sixth amendment actually motivated their race-conscious reforms. Since
courts have consistently rejected cross-section challenges to many of the
selection criteria that produce racial disparity in jury pools, 162 it would
be difficult for officials to persuade a court that they believed in good
faith that failure to correct the underrepresentation caused by these crite163
ria would violate the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
choose between his right to impartial jury and his vicinage right). All three arguments are
complex and controversial.
161 Most courts have concluded that selection procedures for state grand juries are not governed by federal cross-section limits. See, e.g., State v. Fulton, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio)
(noting that sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement does not apply to state grand
juries), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 98 (1991). Some courts, however, continue to assume that the
Constitution imposes some cross-section requirements for state grand jury selection. See, e.g.,
People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1983). However, only a few have applied those requirements to procedures for selecting the grand jury's
foreperson. Compare Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1237 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding defendant cannot raise sixth amendment challenge to selection of state grand jury foreperson unless she demonstrates that foreperson alters representative character of jury by exerting
"overpowering influence" over other jurors so that their views are "substantially diminished
during the deliberative process"), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 2433 (1993) with United States v.
Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting fair cross-section analysis
is only applicable to groups which can represent society as whole, not single person).
162 For instance, Congress has considered registering to vote to be a good proxy for juror
competence. See H.R. Judiciary Comm. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (noting
"[v]oter lists contain an important built-in screening element in that they eliminate those individuals who are either unqualified to vote or insufficiently interested in the world about them to
do so") (emphasis added). Despite proof that voter registration lists consistently underrepresent minorities, their use as jury source lists has been upheld in all but one or two reported cases since 1982. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1013 (11th Cir. 1991)
(upholding use of voter registration lists as exclusive source of prospective jurors); United
States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991) (same);
see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) ("The States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals in case of special hardship or incapacity and to those
engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the
community's welfare."); Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Ky. 1987) (upholding
system in which jurors volunteer to serve), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988); Williams, supra
note 14, at 626 (noting that as of 1990 no sixth amendment challenge to exclusive use of voter
registration lists as source lists had succeeded); id. at 626 n.246 (citing cases).
163 1 am not claiming that any judicial decision upholding a particular selection technique
against a constitutional challenge precludes a subsequent finding of "strong evidence" of unconstitutionality. The equal protection clause does not require states to wait for courts to
declare their policies unconstitutional before curing them. When the risk that a court may find
that a practice is unconstitutional becomes high enough, a state should be permitted to take
remedial action. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that requiring employers to make contemporary finding of past illegality
"would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights
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b. Promotingthe Integrity, Fairness,and Inclusiveness of Criminal
Jury Proceedings. Other goals advanced by maximizing proportional racial representation on juries may justify carefully limited uses of race in
jury selection, even if those goals are not explicitly enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. Proponents of race-conscious selection practices have asserted
three purposes for such proposals: (1) that racial diversity helps assure
impartial decisionmaking, 164 (2) that it enhances public respect for criminal proceedings and acceptance of their results, 165 and (3) that it enables
members of all groups in the community to enjoy the same opportunities
to serve on criminal juries. 166 Because these very goals have animated
the Court's jury discrimination decisions for decades, 167 the Court is unobligations"); cf. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 1991) (al-

lowing proof of discrimination after race-conscious remedial measures were enacted, because
otherwise municipality would "face the dilemma of deciding whether to wait the months necessary for further development of the record, risking constitutional culpability due to its inaction, or to act and to risk liability for acting prematurely but otherwise justifiably"), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 875 (1992).
164 See, e.g., Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 33, at 573-74 (concluding that fair
cross-section on grand jury decreases "the risks of miscommunication and racial or cultural

bias in the process of receiving testimony and deliberation," that "[t]he ethnic, racial and sexual makeup of a jury affects the outcomes of cases," and that "1]ack of understanding among
whites creates an opening for unconscious prejudice and racial bias when evaluating the facts
of a case concerning people of color").
165 See, e.g., id. (finding that representation "enhanc[es] the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the grand jury," and stating that "[pleople of color have a general distrust of the
criminal justice system and exclusion from jury service fosters that distrust"). The Kalamazoo
County, Michigan, proposal was also prompted by the belief that mixed-race juries will treat
minority defendants more fairly and will be perceived as fairer. See Kalamazoo Report, supra
note 3, at 1-7; see also Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 28-36 (finding that fair
racial cross-section enhances perceived fairness of proceedings); Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 33, at 574 (noting that representation "promot[es] greater cooperation between minority communities and law enforcement").
166 See, e.g., Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at 12 (concluding that existing methods of
selection have led to exclusion of minorities from jury process); R. Treece et al., supra note 7,
at 57 (concluding that change is needed to counteract "public perception that [the jury system]
has not done all that it can to be totally democratic, totally inclusionary").
167 See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), in which Justice Marshall stated
in dissent that the cross-section requirement serves three purposes other than assuring
impartiality:
"(1) 'guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power' and ensuring that the 'common
sense judgment of the community' will act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,' (2) preserving 'public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system,' and (3) implementing our belief that 'sharing in the administration of justice is a
phase of civic responsibility.'"
Id. at 495 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 174-75 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975))); see also Taylor,
419 U.S. at 530-31 (" '[T]he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained,
partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration
of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.'" (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); id. at 530 (noting that community participation in
administration of criminal law is "critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:707

likely to maintain that they are illegitimate or trivial governmental goals.
If these interests would fail as compelling goals, it is not because they are
insufficiently important; rather, it is because they may be too difficult to

define. 168 Still, each is more specific than the goal rejected by the Court
as too vague-that of remedying "societal discrimination."1 69 Thus, to-

gether with the goals of remedying unconstitutional practices, these aims
should satisfy the first part of the Court's strict scrutiny test.1 70 The
more difficult hurdle for proponents of race-conscious jury selection procedures is demonstrating that such procedures are "reasonably necessary" to meet these objectives.
2. Proving That Racial ClassificationsAre Reasonably Necessary
to Achieve Compelling Objectives
Even if the Court accepts the goals of remedying unconstitutional
practices and promoting the fairness, integrity, and inclusiveness of crim-

inal proceedings as sufficiently weighty and concrete reasons for adopting
race-conscious procedures, proponents would still have to show that the
procedures are narrowly tailored to accomplish these purposes. Language in the Court's most recent opinions has made this task much more

difficult.
First, the Court will insist on the prior consideration of race-neutral
alternatives, and will be unlikely to accept a jurisdiction's claim that
there are no such options available to accomplish its aims.1 71 If a state
justice system").
168 That these goals are forward-looking rather than compensatory need not bar their recognition as "compelling." See M. Rosenfeld, supra note 106, at 208-11 (noting that both
O'Connor's opinion and the dissenting opinion in Croson recognized as compelling the forward-looking goal of preventing expenditure of public funds to further private racial
discrimination).
169 See note 155 and accompanying text supra (discussing Court's rejection of this goal and
citing cases).
170 The Georgia Supreme Court suggested that race-conscious selection procedures would
be justified by the state's interest in complying with state statutory mandates. See Meders v.
State, 389 S.E.2d 320, 323 (Ga. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 114 (1992). However, that court
appears to have overlooked the fact that one of the primary targets of the equal protection
clause is racially discriminatory state legislative action. Several Supreme Court Justices have
suggested that complying with federal antidiscrimination statutes (such as Title VII or the
Voting Rights Act) may constitute a compelling goal sufficient to justify the first prong of strict
scrutiny, see note 151 supra, and Congress probably has more freedom to act under the equal
protection clause than the states, see note 133 supra. Thus, state statutes granting defendants
rights to racial representation on juries probably would not on their own justify race-conscious
selection procedures. The same analysis would apply to state constitutional provisions.
171See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 589-90 (1990) (upholding raceconscious program under intermediate scrutiny after noting that "the Commission established
minority ownership preferences only after long experience demonstrated that race-neutral
means could not produce adequate broadcasting diversity" and that "Congress agreed with the
Commission's assessment that race-neutral alternatives had failed to achieve the necessary pro-
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wishes to compensate defendants or potential jurors for past intentional
race discrimination, for instance, it is hard to see why racial sorting in
subsequent cases is the best remedy. If a state's goal is to prevent future
intentional discrimination in jury selection, the state could simply deprive jury selectors of the opportunity to discriminate by requiring
mechanical or random selection, or by removing access to information
about the race of potential jurors. For instance, if a jurisdiction that allows its judges to handpick grand jurors from an otherwise representative
venire wants to prevent intentional discrimination, it need only provide
that grand jurors be selected at random from the entire venire. It need
not prescribe racial minimums or percentages. Similarly, grand jury
forepersons could be chosen randomly from among the grand jurors.
And if a jurisdiction learns that litigants are excluding disproportionately
more minority veniremembers during voir dire, it could take the raceneutral step of reducing or eliminating the availability of peremptory
challenges. Similarly, where reformers seek to remedy unintentional yet
systematic underrepresentation caused by facially neutral jury selection
criteria, such as status as a registered voter or the ability to write well in
English, they could simply abandon those criteria. 172
Even in jurisdictions where lawmakers have adopted race-conscious
policies in order to improve the integrity, fairness, and inclusiveness of
criminal jury proceedings, race-neutral methods of increasing racial representation are often available. 173 The most obvious alternative is to
adopt jury source lists that are more inclusive, 174 such as local tax rolls
gramming diversity"); id. at 623-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that FCC's programs could not survive even intermediate scrutiny, because race-neutral and untried means of
directly accomplishing governmental interest were readily available, and listing steps FCC
could have taken but did not); cf. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (listing
following factors for courts to consider when evaluating whether program is narrowly tailored:
"the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration
of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical
goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties").
172 See ABA Jury Standards, supra note 26, at 34-40 (recommending that states use only
objective standards for qualifying jurors-age, citizenship, residency, ability to communicate
in English, and felony status).
173 Many of the race-neutral reforms discussed at notes 174-83 and accompanying text infra
are included in the ABA Jury Standards, supra note 26, now adopted by 14 states and followed
by several more. See Letter from G. Thomas Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies,
National Center for State Courts, to author, at 2 (Nov. 22, 1993) (on file with the New York
University Law Review). The Standards seek to make the jury source list as inclusive and
representative as possible and then to use random selection methods to construct juries from
that source list.
174 See, e.g., Dane County Report, supra note 18, at 15 (recommending that in addition to
licensed drivers and those holding state identification cards, high school students above age 18,
and persons on general relief and AFDC should be included on source list); Georgia Handbook, supra note 3, at 8 (noting various sources of names for potential jurors-such as utility
lists, telephone directories, and lists of licensed drivers-as well as groups each source is most
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or lists of licensed drivers. Updating source or qualified lists more frequently can also increase the numbers of minority race citizens represented on those lists. 175 Jurisdictions can further improve the representativeness of qualified lists and venires by implementing one-step
systems combining summonses and questionnaires, 176 by adopting the
one-day/one-trial method of juror utilization to minimize inconvenience for jurors,1 77 by increasing the compensation paid to all
likely to underrepresent); Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 37-44 (discussing relative potential of expanding representativeness through use of naturalization lists, tribal membership rolls, census data, welfare data, and community organization lists).
States that have switched from voter registration lists to driver's license lists as sources for
juror names have noted a marked improvement in the diversity of their juror pools. See, e.g.,
Letter from Gary J. Barczak, Clerk of Circuit Court, Director of Court Services, Milwaukee
County, to author (Oct. 6, 1993) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting
that conversion to driver's license list "has resulted in a higher percentage of black minorities
appearing for jury service"); Letter of William H. Lyons, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Justice Bureau, New Hampshire Department of Justice, to author (Sept. 9, 1993) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that change to driver's license list
made "composition of the jury pool much younger and [more] ethnically diverse"). Many
states have switched precisely for this reason. See Letter from Lisa Rosenthal, Court Operations Consultant, Office of the Florida State Court Administrator, to author (Sept. 1993) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that change was intended to increase
representation of "especially those minorities underrepresented on the voters list"); see also R.
Treece et al., supra note 7, at 38-40 (recommending that New York consider supplementing its
source lists with more up-to-date utility lists, high school graduation lists, and lists of newly
naturalized citizens and recipients of social service and unemployment benefits).
175 See, e.g., Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at B-4 to B-5 (recommending that Secretary
of State revise driver's license list annually or that new addresses be obtained from U.S. Postal
Service); Alker & Barnard, supra note 18, at 236-37 (recommending that source lists should be
more current and more carefully maintained); see also Senate Report, supra note 15, at 18-19
(describing National Change of Address program for updating voter registration lists with
deaths and changes of residence as an option that is "efficient" and "cost-effective once the
start-up computerization expenses are absorbed").
176 See ABA Jury Standards, supra note 26, at 102-04; see also Telephone Interview with
Errol Giddings, Management Analyst, Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (Sept. 9,
1993) (claiming this practice, in conjunction with addition of one-day/one-trial system, better
follow-up on no-shows, enhanced juror compensation, and no proximity requirements, has
significantly improved representation of low-income and minority race jurors in Colorado's
courts).

177See Rorie Sherman, Gripes Are Changing Jury Duty, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 14
(quoting G. Thomas Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies, National Center for State
Courts, as stating that "more than 30% of the nation's citizens live in jurisdictions that have
one-day/one-trial systems" in which a person's term of jury service is completed upon either
serving for one day, if not selected, or for one trial). Similar reforms that would decrease the
length of time that grand jurors must serve may make grand jury service more feasible for lowincome persons. See Carp & Rowland, supra note 25, at 394 (endorsing Texas legislator's
proposal that grand jury term be shortened from 90 to 30 days, that multiple grand juries be
impaneled so that grand juries would not need to meet as often, and that grand jury sessions be
scheduled during evenings or on Saturdays); Rowland et al., supra note 15, at 247 ("The
greater time demands in Dallas County may represent a greater economic burden and, given
the relatively low median income of minorities, may account for the lower levels of participation among minorities."). For an amusing account of one person's experience with jury duty
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jurors, 17 8 by imposing penalties for employers that retaliate against employees summoned for jury service, 179 and by routinely following up on
non-returned questionnaires and unanswered summonses.1 80 If underrepresentation is traced to a selection system that draws jurors from ar-

eas containing disproportionately fewer African Americans, then an
alternative sampling system that widens the area from which jurors are

drawn and ensures representation by geography rather than race may

improve jury representativeness.1 81 Expanding the size of criminal juries
and reducing the number of peremptory challenges are other race-neutral
measures that would probably produce more racially heterogeneous juries.1 82 Finally, if impartial juries are a state's goal, some improvements
in a court that does not use the one-day/one-trial system, see D. Keith Mano, Jury-Duty
Journal, Nat'l Rev., Nov. 20, 1987, at 65.
178 See, e.g., Dane County Report, supra note 18, at 18 (proposing raising juror fees); Hennepin County Report, supra note 23, at 55-57 (same); Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at 15
(same). Colorado reimburses jurors for their costs, including child care and transportation, for
the first three days of service, and provides them $50.00 per day thereafter. Telephone Interview with Errol Giddings, supra note 176; see also H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra
note 15, at 139 (noting that jurors are awarded $5 per day in most state and federal courts in
California); Carp & Rowland, supra note 25, at 394 (recommending that state systems strive to
meet at least federal fee for grand juries). But see Shaun Sutner, D.C. Plans to Cut Jury Duty
Fee by $30 per Day, Wash. Post, June 13, 1991, at JI (noting that court's executive officer
reported that cut from $32 to $2 a day had not affected juror availability, that recent study
showed that juror fee is "among the least important factors affecting their view of jury service," and that 85% of all businesses paid employees for time spent on short jury stints). The
State of Hawaii once tried to require certain employers to compensate employees for jury
service, but the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. See Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 475 P.2d 679, 683-84 (1970). The ABA recommends that employers be required to pay jurors' salaries for the first three days ofjury service. See ABA Jury
Standards, supra note 26, at 135.
179 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988) (employer who retaliates against any permanent employee as result of employee's jury service shall be liable for lost wages and subject to a civil
penalty of up to $1000); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-106 (Michie 1987) (employer subjecting
employee to any form of penalty on account of her absence from employment by reason ofjury
duty is guilty of misdemeanor); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1640 (1989) (same).
180 See Dane County Report, supra note 18, at 16 (recommending that jury clerk pursue
those who do not return questionnaires and those who fail to appear to maximum extent possible); Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at A-7 (noting that follow-up efforts for those who fail
to respond to questionnaires were very effective-many people who had not replied were
found, and most of those were qualified); Telephone Interview with Errol Giddings, supra note
176 (noting that Colorado's practice of sending "failure-to-appear" notice within one week to
anyone who does not show up with her questionnaire succeeds in bringing in approximately
15% of those who do not show up first time).
181 See generally H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 165-90 (describing
such system). An Illinois statute, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 310/9.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992),
which allows courts in Cook County to draw jurors from predefined portions of Cook County,
rather than its entirety, makes jury duty more convenient for those who may have difficulty
travelling to distant courthouses but sometimes results in less racially diverse jury venires.
Telephone Interview with Thomas Stringer, Special Projects Coordinator, Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (Sept. 8, 1993).
182 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236 (1978) (discussing how reduction in jury size
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may be possible without tinkering with racial composition. For instance,
a court could expand voir dire procedures to permit litigants to learn
more about juror attitudes.18 3 In sum, a number of jury reforms exist
that advance a state's compelling interests in fostering the legitimacy,
impartiality, and inclusiveness of jury proceedings without the explicit
use of racial criteria.
However, these race-neutral methods of enhancing minority representation often carry price tags that are higher than the cost of raceconscious policies which conveniently produce equally diverse jury pools.
For instance, the political and fiscal costs of expanding source lists may
be quite steep in states where the "key-man" system has been in effect for
decades. In such states, a switch to random selection from voter registration or driver's license lists would require a change in state law and an
overhaul of the selection system from the bottom up.18 4

Even in

primarily random systems that already use voter registration lists to generate juror names, supplementing those lists with driver's license lists
may still be costly, especially where such alternative sources are not
decreases "representation of minority groups in the community"); ABA Jury Standards, supra
note 26, at 158 & n.10 (same). Many have recently debated the wisdom of eliminating or
reducing the number of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the
Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 420-23 (1992).
183 But cf. United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting
request of defendant charged with conspiracy against African-American, Hispanic, and Jewish
citizens to ask jurors if they were Jewish), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993); Johnson, supra
note 74, at 1673-75 (noting that few state courts recognize right to voir dire on racial prejudice
and arguing that "voir dire [is] still ineffective in eliminating the effect of racial bias").
184 Texas, for instance, still chooses grand jurors with the key-man system, see Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 19.06 (West 1994), so that switching to another form of selection might entail
significant costs at a time when the state is struggling to fund other reforms in criminal justice
that are arguably just as urgently needed. See, e.g., Mark Hanse, Death Penalty System in
Turmoil, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 32 (noting that many consider reform of Texas's capital
defense representation system desperately needed but unlikely, given that state "doesn't have a
spare red cent"). But see Carp & Rowland, supra note 25, at 394-95 (opining in 1977 that
replacing Texas jury commissioners with random selection methods "promises to be less costly
and more efficient than the present system").
Consider also the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Brooks that when Texas commissioners
select a small group of citizens to serve as grand jurors they must be allowed to include minority jurors intentionally. See Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967). Under strict scrutiny, this makes sense only if Texas's key-man system is
itself inviolate. If, on the contrary, the color-blind imperatives of the fourteenth amendment
outweigh the state's interests in preferring its highly selective system to race-neutral, inclusive,
and random alternatives, Brooks was wrongly decided. See Comment, Jury Selection-Equal
Protection-Deliberate Inclusion of Negroes on Grand Jury Held Constitutional, 42 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 364, 367-68 (1967) (arguing that Brooks was justifiable since it was necessary to
achieve state's compelling interest in "protecting the state's criminal processes from chaotic
disruption, while ensuring that grand juries are fairly representative of a cross-section of the
community"); see also R. Treece et al., supra note 7, at 43 (predicting that costly increase in
juror fees would be difficult to achieve, given competing financial requirements of state court
system).
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computerized.185
The validity of race-conscious selection practices may depend upon

the extent to which the Court will allow states to forgo costly race-neutral reforms in favor of more expedient race-conscious means. The Court
will not require a state to demonstrate that race-neutral means of improving representation are impossible-it seems to have conceded that
there is a difference between alternatives which are realistic or reasonable
and those which are not.1 86 It has also stated repeatedly that states must
be allowed "much leeway" in fashioning jury selection procedures and
that the federal courts should avoid dictating how states select their juries. 187 But the Court's recent equal protection decisions signal that any
deference it has previously granted states in this context will not be extended when states choose racial criteria to select jurors. Indeed, I suspect that only if race-neutral methods of preventing the disproportionate
exclusion of minorities are prohibitively expensive, would the Court find
18 8
race-conscious methods to be "reasonably necessary."
The Court's more recent decisions provide another reason that race185 Georgia provides an example. Administrative and fiscal costs have deterred lawmakers
in Georgia from adopting proposals to supplement its juror source lists with driver's license
lists. The jury commissioners in each of 159 counties are instead required to ensure proportional representation by "oversampling" (my term) groups that are underrepresented on existing source lists. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra (describing this system). The cost
of supplementing the source lists in these counties, despite the automation of some aspects of
voter registration and jury commission procedures, remains high. Each of Georgia's counties
has its own voter registration system and its own jury commission, with no conveniently accessible statewide list of registered voters. Many of Georgia's voter registration lists and juror
source lists are prepared or maintained without computers. However, those responsible for the
statewide driver's license list are permitted by state law to make the list available for jury
commissioners to use. Telephone Interview with Holly K.O. Sparrow, supra note 61; see also
Williams, supra note 14, at 632-33, 633 n.280 (noting that although cost of supplementing
voter registration lists with driver's license lists would not generally be "prohibitive," in states
that do not yet computerize their voter registration lists, computerization would involve significant expense).
186 The majority in Shaw employed the term "reasonably necessary" to describe the appropriate relationship between means and end. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993).
187 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534, 538 (1975) (noting that states have discretion
to grant exemptions from jury duty as well as to prescribe qualifications for jurors); see also
Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) ("States remain free to confine the selection
[of jurors] to citizens, to persons meeting specified qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those possessing good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character.") (footnotes omitted); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473-74 (1952) (noting that proper source ofjury
lists should be left to states).
188 Compare the analysis of the Georgia Supreme Court:
Appellant further argues that the commissioners' bringing more women into the list
after it was determined that they were underrepresented in the voter's registration list set
a "target figure" and therefore discriminated.... He stresses .. that more women
could have been included. However, there must of necessity be a "target figure" to meet
the cross-section requirement.
Berryhill v. State, 291 S.E.2d 685, 691 (Ga.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981
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conscious proposals may not be deemed "reasonably necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to advance compelling interests. These decisions ques-

tion not only the necessity but the very relevance of racial representation
on juries to promoting jury impartiality and enhancing public respect for
criminal proceedings-two of the compelling goals allegedly advanced by

race-conscious selection practices.
First, since 1990 the Court disfavored linking racial composition to
impartiality in juries. In that year, in Metro Broadcastingv. FCC,189 the
Court still assumed that race influences the viewpoint of individuals

when it credited predictions that the type of programming that minorityowned radio stations would offer is different than the type that whiteowned stations would offer. 190 Before 1990, the Court had recognized
that a criminal defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial are affected by
changes in the racial composition of his jury caused by the government's
intentional or systematic exclusion of jurors by race,'91 and had upheld
(1982).
The Hennepin proposal, which reserves two spots on every grand jury for minority members, may fail strict scrutiny for this reason. Indeed, the task force proposal itself recommended several race-neutral reforms which it expects would increase the representativeness of
grand juries, including: (1) integrating of lists from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of recently naturalized citizens and tribal membership rolls into source lists; (2) raising the
jury compensation fee to $30.00 per day; and (3) setting up a day-care center for the children
of jurors like the one operating in the District of Columbia Superior Court. See Hennepin
County Report, supra note 23, at 55-58.
Numbers that would approximate proportional representation on Kalamazoo grand juries
may apparently be achieved without the use of a 25% minority quota in every trial jury venire.
The National Center for State Courts Technical Assistance Report for Kalamazoo County
noted that "the primary reason for the lack of minority representation in the Circuit Court"
was a computer software problem. The district courts were using up more of the city jurors,
who were more likely to be African-American, before the circuit courts drew prospective jurors, a problem that the consultant suggested could be cured by allowing the circuit courts to
select jurors randomly from the county-wide source list before prospective jurors were allocated to district courts. See Kalamazoo Report, supra note 3, at A-12 to A-13; Letter from G.
Thomas Munsterman, supra note 173, at 2-3.
189 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
190 See id. at 582-83. The Court added:
We have recognized ... that the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment
forbids the exclusion of groups on the basis of such characteristics as race and gender
from a jury venire because "[w]ithout that requirement, the State could draw up jury
lists in such manner as to produce a pool of prospective jurors disproportionately ill
disposed towards one or all classes of defendants, and thus more likely to yield petit
juries with similar dispositions." It is a small step from this logic to the conclusion that
including minorities in the electromagnetic spectrum will be more likely to produce a
"fair cross section" of diverse content.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990)); see also id. at
636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority disclaims it, the FCC policy seems
based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain
'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens.").
191See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 & n.8, 87 (1986) (explaining why defendant's personal right to equal protection is violated by racial discrimination against
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the deliberate creation of majority-minority voting districts under the
Voting Rights Act. 192 Since 1990, however, the Court has appeared to
reject any assumption that the views of African Americans and whites
can be predicted to differ under certain given circumstances.193 Should a
case squarely raising this issue reach the Court, this trend suggests that
the Court will refuse to acknowledge that race has anything to do with
the actual behavior of jurors or the outcome of jury proceedings. 194
veniremembers); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471 (1953) (stating that jury discrimination
denies "to an accused of the race against which such discrimination is directed" his rights to
equal protection); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), in which Justice
Thomas stated:
[S]ecuring representation of the defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.... [The
public) apparently recognize[s] that conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in our
society and that it may influence some juries. Common experience and common sense
confirm this understanding.
Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas later termed the Court's
"assumption" in early cases that "all-white juries might judge black defendants unfairly" as
reasonable." Id.; see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990) (noting that systematic exclusion ofjurors by race when composing venire would lead to petit jury "disproportionately ill disposed towards one or all classes of defendants"); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 531-32, 532 n.12 (1975) (holding that systematic exclusion of women from venire violated
male defendant's sixth amendment rights in part because juror gender affects deliberations and
results, and citing social psychology studies as support).
192 See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1976).
193 See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 ("This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an
impartial juror."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (rejecting prosecutor's use of racebased peremptory challenges, stating, "We may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination
the very stereotype the law condemns"). One of the most adamant advocates of color-blind
principles, Justice O'Connor, seems to waffle on this particular question. Compare Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 615 ("[The interest in diversity of
viewpoints provides no legitimate, much less important, reason to employ race classifications
apart from generalizations impermissibly equating race with thoughts and behavior.") with her
dissent in McCollum, in which she stated:
It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors
perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining
the verdict of guilt or innocence.... In a world where the outcome of a minority defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of white jurors, there is cause to
question the implications of this Court's good intentions.
112 S. Ct. at 2364.
The position of Justice Stevens is also difficult to divine. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-14 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that use of race is "absolutely prohibit[ed]" in selection ofjuries "because it is completely unrelated to any valid public
purpose") with Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (approving of
race-conscious plan to achieve diversity in broadcasting, noting cross-section jury cases). Additional ambiguity arises from the tension between the Court's rejection of any link between
racial composition and impartiality and its finding that a litigant suffers an "actual injury"
sufficient to raise the rights of excluded jurors when those jurors are excluded because of their
race. See text accompanying notes 134-44 supra (describing standing cases).
194 Indeed, the Court's latest shifts undermine the very basis for the defendant's personal
rights to a jury drawn from a venire that reflects a fair cross-section of the community, or to a
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Some lower courts have already concluded that the Court's decisions
render "untenable" any argument that juror race affects juror imp19 5
artiality.
Second, the Court's insistence in Shaw that predictions of race-specific behavior damage the legitimacy of democratic institutions makes it
particularly difficult for the Court to acknowledge that race-based jury
selection could promote even the appearanceof impartiality. In the view
of the Court's current majority, attention to race increases and never decreases racial hostility and distrust, except perhaps when race is used to
identify and compensate those wronged by prior intentional discrimination.196 Taken at face value, the Court in Shaw may have effectively precluded arguments that attention to racial composition on juries can ever
improve public respect for criminal jury proceedings. 197 In sum, judges
reading recent Supreme Court opinions are not likely to consider raceconscious selection procedures "reasonably necessary" to achieve any of
the goals lawmakers promoting them hope to achieve.
III
THE CASE FOR SOME RACE CONSCIOUSNESS:
ADAPTING CROSON AND SHAW TO THE JURY CONTEXT

As more and more jurisdictions adopt race-conscious procedures in
order to increase minority representation on juries, 198 courts are likely to
jury chosen without intentional discrimination against members of his race. See Underwood,
supra note 129, at 727 (suggesting that focus on rights of excluded jurors rather than rights of
defendants "provides a better explanation for the current structure of jury discrimination
law").
195See, e.g., United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting African-American defendant's contention that all-white jury which convicted him of illegally possessing gun was biased because white jurors could not understand relationship between white
Chicago police officers and inner-city African Americans and thus could not fairly assess credibility of white police officers who testified against him); see also King, supra note 1, at 105-08
(noting lower court resistance to recognizing that jury discrimination prejudices defendant).
One judge, however, has granted a mistrial based on the relationship between race and impartiality. See State v. Davis, No. KO-92-600595 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Crim. Div., Oct. 1, 1993)
(granting African-American defendants' motions for mistrial after concluding that all-white
venire summoned to consider whether defendants had raped a "juvenile white woman" "created an atmosphere where [the judge] came to doubt that the litigants.., would receive a fair
trial").
196 See notes 121-33 and accompanying text supra (discussing increased skepticism of factoring race into jury selection process).
197 For a similar view, see Underwood, supra note 129, at 749 ("Courts that permit racebased jury selection present themselves to the public as hypocrites ....Courts jeopardize their
moral authority as chief enforcers of antidiscrimination norms, unless they impose the same
requirements [of compliance with antidiscrimination law] on themselves.").
198 Race-bias task forces calling for immediate reform are proliferating. See, e.g., ABA
Report, supra note 38, at 1, 18 (noting reports on racial bias in justice system from several
states and recommending that ABA make "any recommendations regarding federal and state
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encounter challenges to such procedures by criminal defendants. The
Supreme Court's recent decisions appear to leave judges little room to
regard these jurymandering practices as anything but impermissible
quick fixes for societal inequities. These decisions should deter riskaverse state officials confronted with urgent pleas for increased representation of minorities on juries from adopting race-conscious policies. The
threat of lost convictions may cause such officials to tolerate existing policies that produce underrepresentative juries, but which have already
weathered constitutional attack.
For adherents of color-blind principles, this is exactly the right result. I disagree. It is one thing to tell lawmakers that they need not
remedy the unequal effects of race-neutral selection policies; it is an entirely different matter to tell them they must not do so. A virtual ban on
race-consciousness in jury selection not only strikes me as unduly formalistic, but it also ignores the prominence of race in our understanding of
jury fairness and the complexity of the Court's previous treatment of race
and juries. A rigid application of Shaw and Croson to race-conscious
attempts to enhance minority presence on juries and in jury pools would
underestimate the significant improvement in public support and respect
for criminal jury decisions that racially representative juries and jury
pools can produce. It would also overestimate the harms that flow from
governmental recognition that racial composition ever matters. In Shaw,
the Court suggested that the use of race to define or construct democratic
institutions will plant the poisonous seed of racial balkanization-or at
least fertilize what is already rooted. 19 9 However valid this prediction
jury pool policies necessary to eliminate [the] discriminatory impact" of existing policies) (emphasis added); Dane County Report, supra note 18, at 19 (recommending that "issues involving representation on juries be given highest priority"); id. at D-7 (noting that committee
agreed "the goal of the system should be to insure that the pool of jurors actually summoned to
the courthouse is representative of the community as a whole"); Report and Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, "Where the
Injured Fly for Justice": Reforming Practices Which Impede the Dispensation of Justice to
Minorities in Florida 28-30 (1991) [hereinafter Florida Report] (recommending that legislature
adopt measures designed to increase diversity of juries in Florida); see also Suellyn
Scarnecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and Ethnic Bias in the Courts,
16 Hamline L. Rev. 923, 936-37 (1993) (noting that five published task force reports recommended reforms to increase representation of minorities on juries); Victoria Slind-Flor, Jury
Commissions Hope for More Prominence, Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1992, at 31 (noting that 17
jurisdictions have convened commissions to address racial and ethnic bias in judicial system).
One provision in the pending federal crime bill authorizes federal grants for states to study the
role of race in their criminal justice systems and includes as one of the award criteria, "whether
the state plan expressly considers the role of race in procedures for jury selection in the State."
H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1021(b)(2) (1993); S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1021
(1993).
199See text accompanying notes 121-28 supra.
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about the effects of race-consciousness may be in other contexts,2°° it fails

when applied uniformly to juries. Some race-conscious jury selection
methods may have these effects; others will not.

I propose a modest three-part caveat to the harsh lessons of the
Court's most recent cases: even if strict scrutiny is the appropriate

method for evaluating these policies, courts that apply such scrutiny
should recognize (1) that maximizing the appearance of fairness of criminal jury proceedings is a compelling governmental interest, 20 1 (2) that
fair racial representation on juries is vital to the appearance of fairness in
criminal jury proceedings, and (3) that in some circumstances race-conscious selection practices may improve, not impair, this appearance. In
other words, government attention to the racial composition of criminal

juries and jury pools may enhance rather than undermine race relations
and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.2 0 2 This concession to
color consciousness, circumscribed by the remaining requirements of
strict scrutiny, could justify some carefully limited race-conscious reforms to improve racial representativeness in jury selection, even when
existing procedures meet constitutional minimums. I argue that proportional representation need not be engineered for every jury in order to
build and sustain multiracial support for jury proceedings, and that certain forms of jurymandering do more long-term damage to a bias-free
image of our jury system than others. I conclude by suggesting some
200 In his dissent in Shaw, Justice Souter doubted the majority's prediction that race-conscious voter redistricting is socially harmful:
[I]t seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's
creation of this strangely-shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white
plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed
why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's
vote.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2848 n.9 (1993) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954); see also Bernard Grofman et al., Minority Representation and the Quest for
Voting Equality 132 (1993) (claiming "there seems to be no factual basis for asserting that
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act has led to an increase in racial polarization by making
race a more salient feature of politics than it had been previously"); cf. Kennedy, supra note
105, at 1331 (arguing that stigmatization that results when African Americans are absent exceeds any stigma that affirmative action policies may cause).
201 See text accompanying notes 164-66 supra (discussing goals related to maximizing appearance of fairness).
202 A similar argument has been advanced to justify race-based promotion practices by a
police department. See Hayes v. City of Charlotte, 10 F.3d 207, 213 (1993). The application
of Shaw to racially gerrymandered voting districts may require a similar legitimacy-sensitive
analysis. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 647-49 (predicting that in order for
Court to accept state's interest in "diversity" as compelling reason that would justify raceconscious districting, state must avoid "rigid quotas" and emphasize effects of diversity on
legitimacy). I do not examine in this Article the applicability of this approach to nonjury
contexts.
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features that distinguish those affirmative action measures that are likely
to improve public confidence in the fairness of our jury system to all
groups from measures that are not likely to have this effect.
A.

The Relationship Between Racial Representation on Juries
and the Appearance of Fairness

Unrepresentative juries breed racial resentment. Many Americans
already believe that the criminal justice system cannot be impartial to
people of all races so long as juries continually fail to include a fair
number of jurors from minority racial groups. 20 3 Abundant evidence
demonstrates that many whites distrust African-American jurors and
that many African Americans distrust white jurors. 2°4 The destructive
impact of this resentment can be immediate and volatile.20 5 Or it can be
203 See Florida Report, supra note 198, at 29 (quoting African-American man who asked:
"I have been registered [since 1950] and voted in every election.... I have yet to be selected
for jury duty .... You're going to tell me that's fair?"); H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury,
supra note 15, at 21 ("A wall of racial tensions may have been built between black and white
populations, despite-and because of-structured practices like the underrepresentation of minority jurors and their ideological justification. Without jury participation by racial and ethnic
minorities, racial dominance is structurally reinforced and perpetuated by individual racism
and the withdrawal of support by minorities." (citation omitted)); Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
Psychology and the Legal System 226-27 (1987) ("When the jury does not include all the
components of the community, its voice is seen as false, and the community is likely to reject
its outcome as invalid.... [A] defendant [might] reject the jury's decision if he or she is found
guilty by a jury that has nothing in common with him or her. If members of underrepresented
groups .. do not serve, they are more likely to develop hostile attitudes toward the legal
process."); Charles Whitaker, Is There a Conspiracy to Keep Blacks off Juries?, Ebony, Sept.
1992, at 54, 56 ("In the court of public opinion, the change of venue and other high profile
examples of under-representation or complete lack of representation of Blacks on juries have
the distinct smell of pure racism.").
204 See, e.g., King, supra note 1, at 126 nn.242-44 (citing sources); Robert J. Maeoun &
Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the Criminal Jury, 12 Law & Hum.
Behav. 333, 347 (1988) (reporting study of 96 Northwestern University psychology students in
which researchers found that subjects felt that overrepresentation of minorities, beyond their
representation in community, jeopardizes fairness of jury); Daniel W. Shuman & Dr. Jean A.
Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your Mind: Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and
Nonjurors, 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 449, 456 (1992) ("Several... studies have.., found that race
influences perceptions of fairness in the judicial system."); see also R. Treece et al., supra note
7, at 1 (citing studies finding "general perception of bias in the court system and a high level of
mistrust among the black and Hispanic persons surveyed").
205 The Rodney King case was a reminder that the lack of minority representation on criminal juries can trigger social disillusion, frustration, and even violence. Cf. King, supra note 1,
at 112 n.188, 124 n.234 (noting unrest precipitated by decisions of unrepresentative juries in
Miami and in Tyler, Texas).
The Court itself has recognized that the "need for public confidence is especially high in
cases involving race-related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will
inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice
system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related crimes."
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (citation omitted). The Court went on to
explain that public confidence is undermined by convictions or acquittals obtained by the de-
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less obvious. For instance, when an African-American defendant is convicted or sentenced to death and a white defendant is treated more leniently, or when a white victim is vindicated while an African-American
victim is not,20 6 the absence of fair racial representation on the juries
involved allows observers and participants to attribute these disparities to
juror race. In other words, even if racial composition does not make
much real difference in jury decisions, 20 7 underrepresentation fuels the
suspicion that it does and intensifies the skepticism about the race-neutrality of jury proceedings already felt by the public, 20 as well as by
many jurors themselves. 2°9 As the Chair of The Jury Project of New
liberate use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons of one race. See id.
206 Several empirical analyses of death-sentencing decisions have found that the probability
of receiving a death sentence is higher for African-American defendants or for defendants
whose victims were white. See King, supra note 1, at 96-97 n. 128 (citing studies).
207 1 continue to believe that juror race can influence verdicts in some cases, but that premise is not essential to my argument here. See King, supra note 1, at 67-105 (reviewing empirical evidence on link between juror race and jury decisions); see also Herman, supra note 101,
at 1836-39 (arguing that even proportional representation will fail to change many verdicts so
long as African-American jurors remain minorities on juries).
208 See H. Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury, supra note 15, at 4 ("The persistent underrepresentation of racial minorities has contributed to public distrust and lack of faith in the
legal system."); see also ABA Report, supra note 38, at 22 ("A justice system which is not a
racial and ethnic cross-section of the community it serves fosters the perception of racial and
ethnic discrimination."); MaeCoun & Tyler, supra note 204, at 347 (finding that subjects' perceptions of fairness of jury depends on extent to which jury represents community); Toni M.
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 557-60 (1986) (explaining "popular perceptions" of right to
racial peers on criminal juries and arguing that exclusion of minority jurors "so distracts observers that they disregard the facts of the case altogether and begin to suspect, without more,
that the outcome is unfair"); John Caher, Study Urges Recruiting of Minority Jurors, Albany
Times Union, Apr. 12, 1993, at B2 ("'If we continue to promote this disrespect for the law,
which comes about when African-Americans and other people of color are left outside the
process, we are going to continue to find that people are not going to respect law enforcement.... It is absolutely crucial. We have to overcome this perception that the system is
inherently unfair.'" (quoting Alice Green, Director, Center for Law and Justice, Albany,
N.Y.)); Gary A. Hengstler, How Judges View Retrial of L.A. Cops, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at
70, 71 (reporting survey of 401 state and federal judges which revealed that "34 percent of the
judges concluded that race probably affects the verdict of an all-white jury when one of the
parties on trial is black;" 23% conclude same is true when party is Hispanic; and 17% if party
is "Asian or any other minority"); cf. Robert L. Young, Race, Conceptions of Crime and
Justice, and Support for the Death Penalty, 54 Soc. Psychol. Q. 67, 71 (1991) (reporting that
study of 504 white and 136 African-American residents of Detroit area showed that "blacks
are significantly more likely than whites to perceive [death] sentencing inequities," and concluding that attitudes of African Americans and whites toward criminal justice system are
influenced by different factors).
209 A recent survey compared the attitudes of veniremembers who had been summoned and
then released without being asked to serve on a criminal jury with those who ended up serving
on criminaIjuries. See generally Shuman & Hamilton, supra note 204. The study showed that
African Americans who had served as jurors perceived the jury system as less, not more, fair
than African-American nonjurors. See id. at 464. Another recent survey touted as "the most
extensive poll of former jurors ever conducted" found that African Americans who had served

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1993]

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION

York concluded in her introductory remarks to her commission:
"Among minorities, a perception that they are not being called to serve

in sufficient numbers exacerbates existing suspicions about whether the
justice system works for minorities or is stacked against them." 210
It is not difficult to explain why racial diversity on juries is more
important to us than racial diversity in other contexts. Jurors perform a
special task shared only by judges themselves: they assign criminal liabil-

ity and sometimes determine whether individuals live or die. Wielding
this power, majority groups have used the criminal justice system to op-

press members of minority groups throughout our country's history. 211
The targets of other affirmative action efforts-unrepresentative faculties,
boards of directors, even legislatures 2 12-lack this distinguishing fea21 3
ture.
The Supreme Court is not blind to the significance that litigants and
court observers attach to the racial composition of juries. Indeed, the
Court once appeared comfortable linking juror race to jury fairness. By
concluding that intentional or systematic racial discrimination in the selection of criminal juries violated the constitutional rights of the defendants tried by those juries, the Court has enshrined the link between juror
race and jury fairness in the Bill of Rights. 21 4 By interpreting the sixth
amendment to prohibit not only intentional discrimination in jury selecon juries had significantly lower confidence in the race neutrality of the jury process than
former jurors who were white, but it did not compare these findings to the attitudes of people
who had never served on juries. Racial Divide Affects Black, White Panelists, Natl L.J., Feb.
22, 1993, at S8, S9 (reporting that 67% of black jurors versus only 33% of white jurors think
that minority defendants are treated less fairly at trial than are white defendants, and that
more than 66% of African-American jurors versus only 27% of white jurors agreed that African Americans unfairly receive death penalty more often than whites).
One cause of the negative attitudes by minorities reported in these sources appears to be
underrepresentation itself. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559,
1568-70 (1989) (relating stories of African Americans who had served on juries). If so, then
improving racial representation on juries will improve the attitudes of African Americans toward the jury system, not damage it further.
210 Memorandum from Colleen McMahon, Chair, to Members of The Jury Project, Introductory Remarks 2 (Aug. 13, 1993) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
211 See Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question of Color 115-65 (1993) (providing history of American laws which have been used to oppress people of color); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739, 1743-66 (1993) (describing
ways in which racial stereotypes are presented to juries in criminal cases).
212 Even elected bodies, which certainly have the power to oppress racial minorities, are
more easily checked by the courts. They also do not sentence individuals.
213 Indeed, there is evidence that some juries in early America were deliberately composed
of both Native Americans and colonists to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of verdicts, and
that the "mixed jury" or jury "de mediate linguae" was "alive and well" when the sixth
amendment was adopted. Ramirez, supra note 65, at 24-25.
214 See note 191 and accompanying text supra (citing leading cases); see also Herman, supra
note 101, at 1819-24 (discussing link between racial discrimination injury selection and defendant's right to verdict untainted by discrimination).
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tion but also certain selection practices that are race-neutral but which
systematically create significant disparate effects, 2 15 the Court has recognized that the Bill of Rights provides extraordinary remedies for jury
discrimination beyond those typically required by the equal protection
clause. The Court in these earlier cases was right. There is more to be
concerned about when juries fail to reflect the racial diversity of the communities from which they are drawn than just the equal protection rights
of potential jurors-the very legitimacy of ourjury system is at stake.
Read as a whole, the jury decisions from the past two decades
demonstrate that the Court is acutely aware of the inherent conflict between the two values or norms that dominate these cases: the importance of recognizing that racial composition affects fairness, or at least its
appearance, and the imperative to avoid treating potential jurors differently because of their race or endorsing the legitimacy of racial discrimination. When the Court attempts to accommodate both of these
concerns at once, we end up with a set of precedents premised upon reasoning that looks incoherent.21 6 Depending on which of these values one
holds most dear, the cases give one the impression that just when the
Court gets going in the right direction, it forgets its destination and veers
off the other way. The majority opinions in the most recent cases concerning peremptory challenges are typical. In those cases, the Court
chides litigants for using racial predictions to secure more favorable verdicts, but then uses the same predictions itself to find that race-based
peremptory challenges cause opposing litigants enough actual injury to
2 17
satisfy standing requirements.
As merely the latest chapter in this long struggle, the language and
reasoning in Shaw, Croson, and McCullom do not definitively prohibit a
state from ever considering racial composition when constructing juries
or assessing jury fairness. Instead, the Court is likely to continue to treat
race-consciousness in the jury cases the same way that some scholars
have suggested the Court is treating race-consciousness in the voting context: defining, case by case, those situations in which one value should
trump the other, attempting all the while to preserve a middle ground
where both can coexist. 218 In the next Section, I offer a framework for
215 See notes 152-53, 157, and accompanying text supra (discussing leading cases).
216 See, e.g., note 193 supra (noting contradictory statements of Justices Stevens and

O'Connor on these issues); see also King, supra note 1, at 67-69 (noting Court's contradictory
statements about whether jury discrimination affects jury decisions).
217 See text accompanying notes 134-38 supra (describing Powers).
218 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *,at 640 (terming Court's approach to raceconscious districting decisions as "bobbing and weaving"); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 126, at
499-506 ("Shaw rests on the view that, in certain areas, the Court's role in construing the
Constitution should be to require policymakers to accommodate and sustain the tension
between conflicting values, rather than to permit one important value to subordinate all
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defining this middle ground in a way that respects both competing
threats to public confidence in the impartiality of the jury system-the
2 19
risk of ignoring race and the risk of recognizing its significance.
B. Striking a Compromise: Assessing the Relationship Between
the Use of Race in Jury Selection and the Appearance of Fairness,
or How Much Attention to Race Is Too Much Attention to Race?
While racially representative juries can bring tremendous gains in
public confidence in jury verdicts, those benefits will be in part dependent
upon the fairness of the procedures used to impanel representative juries.
The perceived impartiality of jury proceedings and their results depends
upon more than the racial make-up of the juries; the views of court
watchers and participants are also affected by the selection process itself.
Selection practices may influence the appearance of fairness to different
degrees and in different ways. Some of the more obvious or burdensome
jurymandering practices may, as the Court in Shaw predicted, aggravate
racial distrust of jury verdicts; other uses of race in the selection process
may not, at least not to the same degree. The net effect of each jurymandering method on the general confidence in the fairness of jury verdicts is what matters. Any assessment of that net effect for each selection
method must consider the relative ability of the method to secure racial
diversity on jury panels as well as its relative tendency systematically to
create and reinforce the perception that jurors of particular racial groups
cannot be fair to litigants in particular cases. In other words, if the Court
in Shaw found racial classifications constitutionally offensive because
they ultimately deepen racial divides, it need not reject every use of race
in jury selection.
This is, I admit, an argument that sometimes a little bit of racial
sorting won't hurt. This position, however, is one I believe the Court
should be prepared to take. 2 20 I also concede that deciding which pracothers.").
219 In seeking to accommodate both values, I disagree with Professor Andrew Kull, author
of The Color-Blind Constitution (1992), who argues in his article, Racial Justice: Trial By
Cross-Section, New Republic, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17, that any admission that juror race matters
is too costly because it carries the same "repulsive implication[s]" of modem voting rights law,
that "a person can neither represent another's interest effectively nor judge him fairly unless he
is of the same race." Id. at 20. I do not deny that there is a price to be paid should courts
uphold race-conscious selection practices. I believe, however, that the price is not constant,
that the Court has willingly paid it in the past by recognizing a criminal defendant's personal
constitutional rights to a jury selected without systematic or intentional discrimination against
members of his race, and that the price of ignoring underrepresentation entirely is probably
much higher.
220 Cf. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 645 (characterizing Shaw as embodying an
"it's-OK-to-use-race-but-not-too-much" standard).
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tices do more good than harm is a difficult task. 221 But the Court has
already accepted a similar responsibility by interpreting the equal protection clause to allow those racial classifications that pass strict scrutiny.
I suggest that courts analyze which race-conscious reforms are reasonably necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of
jury proceedings by considering the following six circumstances. First,
strict scrutiny's preference for race-neutral alternatives is a threshold
consideration that courts can use to distinguish selection procedures that
are "necessary" to the goal of minimizing race-based hostility to criminal
jury proceedings from those that are not. The smaller the role that race
plays in the selection process, the less likely it is that the process will be
seen as endorsing or encouraging race-based decisionmaking. Thus, only
if race-neutral methods of increasing racial representativeness on juries
are impractical or have failed should race-conscious measures remain an
option. Requiring the exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives is particularly sound in the jury context, where the kind of race-neutral reforms I
have discussed in Part II tend to bring in representatives of many groups
of people disproportionately excluded by traditional selection methods
and afford the extra benefit of making jury service more convenient for
all. Because race-neutral procedures can generate juries that are as diverse as those selected with race-conscious methods, 222 strict scrutiny's
preference for race-neutral alternatives would invalidate many of the procedures described in Part I.
A second and related consideration should be whether or not the
race-conscious jury selection measure is permanent or temporary. An
affirmative selection policy is more likely to be perceived as narrowly
tailored to the goal of improving the appearance of fairness of criminal
jury proceedings if it has representative race-neutral procedures as its
long-term goal. 223 A trial run of race-conscious reforms may, for exam-

ple, infuse enough minority community members into the system so that
those who then participate may begin to counteract resistance in some
minority communities to jury service. 224
221 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 126, at 508 (stating that measuring message that governmental action conveys is exercise "fraught with complexity and unlikely to yield determinate,
single right answers"); id. at 586 (noting that Shaw "is bereft of virtually any guidance as to
how the elusive principles that underlie its holding are to be turned into an administrable set of
standards").
222 See text accompanying notes 171-83 supra.
223 Cf. Ira Glasser, Affirmative Action and the Legacy of Racial Injustice, in Eliminating
Racism: Profiles in Controversy 341, 353 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988)
(affirmative action remedies must be "temporary and measured" to avoid institutionalizing
legitimacy of race bias).
224 See note 19 supra (noting that one cause of underrepresentation of minorities on qualified lists and venires may be low response rate to jury questionnaires in some minority communities); note 209 supra (suggesting that existing dissatisfaction with jury system felt by African
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Four additional factors will help courts identify which race-conscious reforms are reasonably necessary to promote the appearance of
fairness in criminal jury proceedings: the relative burdens that the procedure places on individuals, 2 25 the specificity with which race is identified
with fairness in particular cases or case-types, the extent to which race
dominates selection criteria, and the identity of the group disadvantaged.
The net gain in jury legitimacy from more diverse juries will be diminished or nullified completely when jurymandering becomes especially
burdensome to individuals; when it is clearly linked to particular cases
and their participants, intensifying the racial distrust in such cases; when
it endorses race as the most salient determinant of a fair juror; or when it
tends to favor historically advantaged groups. Race-conscious policies
that best avoid these features should be constitutional.
Voir dire procedures that perfect the racial composition of each and
every jury panel by sorting veniremembers by race are more likely to
have the divisive effects that the Shaw Court predicted. First, an individual veniremember is more likely to notice and resent the effects of race on
her opportunities for jury service, in part because she has much more to
lose than potential jurors whose opportunities are decreased earlier in the
process. When judges select summoned grand jury veniremembers by
race or when litigants exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of
race, those who are chosen and rejected may feel demeaned by the process. This "open and public" 226 use of race causes veniremembers to suffer personal indignities they might not suffer had race been taken into
account before the summoning process. 227 Assurances that jurors are seAmericans who have served as jurors would be reduced if more minorities served).
225 The Court has distinguished valid hiring preferences from invalid lay-off preferences by
reasoning that losing one's job because of one's race is much more onerous than not getting a
job or promotion for the same reason. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 282-83 (1986) (Powell, J.) with id. at 319 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling Powell's
distinction "wholly unpersuasive," "artificial," and having "no bearing on the equal protection
question"); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 n.72 (1986) (upholding congressional minority set-aside policy in part because burden on nonminority businesses was
light). The dissenters in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), referred to
this "undue burden" test as an "independent requirement" of equal protection scrutiny, stating
that "[t]he Government cannot employ race classifications that unduly burden individuals who
are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups." Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For a critique of this method of evaluating race-conscious measures, see L. Tribe, supra
note 105, at 1536-37 ("Distinguishing between otherwise justified affirmative action plans on
the basis of the degree of sacrifice they extract from equally innocent white workers... subordinates the achievement of racial justice to whatever pattern of economic distribution our discriminatory past happens to have produced.").
226 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 11 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
227 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992) (noting that "the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination" when peremptory challenges are exercised on
the basis of race); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (noting that stigma and dishonor
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lected from the venire in proportion to the representation of their group
in the community may not remove the sting of being chosen or rejected
by race.228 Also, by the time a veniremember has responded to a jury
summons, her life has been disrupted: she has arranged to miss work,
made alternative arrangements for children and others in her care, paid
for transportation and parking, and found her way to the courthouse.
Second, the more claim- or case-specific racial sorting appears, the
greater the probability that observers and participants will assume that
juror race will determine case outcome in similar circumstances. Certainly, all race-conscious selection procedures convey a similar message:
"The government takes precautionary steps to prevent racially skewed
jury pools because it wants everybody to have an equal opportunity to
participate in the process and because juror race may matter in some
cases to some people." This much strikes me as reasonable, even though
it has the potential to "'stimulate our society's latent race-consciousness.' "229 But when a judge or attorney uses race to choose individual
grand jurors or trial jurors for a particular case, she sends a different,
more offensive message. Race-based voir dire procedures say to the excluded veniremember: "Because of your race, we don't trust you to be
fair in this case." The included veniremember hears, "You are included
in this case because you are the right color," and the litigant learns, "Jurors of different races will vote differently in your case." These lessons
have a much more sinister and destructive quality because of their personal, case-specific, and immediate nature. Finally, the race-based selection of veniremembers for grand and trial juries is difficult to recast as a
race-neutral, or even a mixed-motive process, unlike some other raceconscious selection methods. 2 30 These combined effects of race-based exclusion at the voir dire stage outweigh the advantages of having a per231
fectly representative panel for each case.
accompany race-based peremptory challenges).
228 In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), Justice Marshall explained in dissent:
That the juror may eventually be seated on a jury in another case is immaterial; no one
can be expected to perceive himself to be a full participant in our system of criminal
justice, or in our society as a whole, when he is told by a representative of the government that, because of his race, he is too stupid or too biased to serve on a particular jury.
That he might not have to suffer such an indignity in every case is not an answer to the
injury inflicted by the one instance of racism he is forced to endure.
Id. at 497 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430

U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)).
230 See text accompanying note 235 infra. The Court has been somewhat more open to
race-consciousness when race is only one of many factors decisionmakers take into account.
See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *,at 608-18 (comparing Shaw's excessive reliance
approach with Court's earlier approach in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)).
231 As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in Holland:
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If some race-conscious selection procedures are necessary, lawmakers should choose measures that are least burdensome to potential
jurors, least likely to cause resentment, and which do not depend on the
type of case or litigant that the jury will consider. Officials who trace
underrepresentation on trial juries to their qualified lists, for example,
should attempt to use race to construct qualified lists that are more representative instead of ignoring underrepresentation on the qualified lists
and manipulating voir dire procedures to obtain representative juries.
Under this framework, it would be difficult to justify the methods of
grand jury selection proposed in Hennepin County or used by the trial
judge in Ramseur if less burdensome methods were available to ensure
racial representation in grand jury venires and grand jurors and their
forepersons could be chosen randomly from those venires. 232
Some race-conscious procedures that are case-specific may be more
tolerable than race-sorting of a summoned venire, applying these criteria.
A venue change statute like the one in Florida 233 is an example of a raceconscious selection practice that prevents more bad will than it creates.
Even though a decision to change venue is case- and party-specific, the
burdens it places upon individual potential jurors because of their race
are minuscule. 2 34 A judge's effort to reproduce the racial composition of
the population surrounding the original trial site when changing venues
may vastly improve public acceptance of the jury verdict in the transferred case, while creating relatively little race-based resentment about
the actual process of selecting that jury. 2 3 5 This is especially likely when
race is only one of several demographic features the judge attempts to
The public is unlikely to perceive that our system of criminal justice is unfair simply
because a particular jury does not represent every segment of the community, especially
where the jury's composition is merely the result of a spin of the jury wheel. Public
confidence is undermined by the appearance that the government is trying to stack the
deck against criminal defendants and to remove African Americans from jury service
solely because of their race. No similar inference can be drawn from the operations of
chance.
493 U.S. at 499; cf. Golash, supra note 115, at 174-77 (arguing that Court's ban on intentional
discrimination in courtroom in Batson and Powers furthers appearance of fairness rather than
actual fairness).
232 See Comment, supra note 184, at 368-70 (arguing that, while deliberate inclusion of
minority jurors on source lists may be at least temporarily necessary to ensure that racial
groups are not excluded, "deliberate inclusion on the intermediate panel seems almost impossible to justify").
233 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
234 See note 120 supra (considering harms to residents of rejected trial destinations).
235 Cf. Gilbert, supra note 7, at 1927-28 ("[The] appearance of bias in the creation of the
jury by virtue of the change of venue [from a location with a substantial representation of
people of color to a location with fewer or none of the same people] causes continuing distrust
and cynicism about the operation of the criminal justice system with respect to the excluded
group."); id. at 1932 (arguing that "a consciousness of the need for inclusion .. should be
injected into the court's considerations in the change of venue decision especially in racially
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duplicate. Such procedures help prevent those observing and participating in jury proceedings from readily attributing outcomes to juror race,
and encourage them instead to focus debates about fairness away from
juror race to other aspects of criminal proceedings.
To illustrate this approach in hypothetical terms, assume that Mr.
Doe (who is African-American) and Ms. Smith (who is white) are residents of Diver City, an urban area with twenty-five percent AfricanAmerican, sixty-five percent white, and ten percent other-race adult residents. Assume that a judge from Publi City, a city in another county, in
which half the adult population is African-American, decides that she
must grant a motion for a change of venue in a case filed there. If she
rejects Diver City as a potential venue and chooses another site because
the racial demographics of the jury pool there more closely match those
of Publi City, what is the impact on Mr. Doe and Ms. Smith? They are
deprived of a very small chance to serve as jurors in that case, simply
because there are too many whites and not enough African Americans
living in Diver City. Considering that their expectations for serving as
jurors in a case from another county must be very slim to begin with and
that their opportunities for serving on juries in every other case filed in
Diver City have not been affected at all, the disadvantage each suffers is
minimal. And even if that disadvantage is attributable to race, it is not
their own race that made the difference, but the collective racial composition of their community. From the perspective of Mr. Doe or Ms. Smith,
then, the decision does not appear particularly unfair. From the perspective of the litigants and their respective supporters, the decision enhances
fairness by preventing what might otherwise have been perceived as a
demographic windfall for one side.
Consider a second example, involving the race-conscious construction of qualified juror lists. Assume that the jury source list for Diver
City (a combined driver's license list and voter registration list) reflects a
fair cross-section of the African-American adult residents (twenty-five
percent), but by the time potential jurors are qualified through questionnaires, the percentage of African Americans on the qualified list drops to
fifteen percent. Assume that in order to boost the number of African
Americans on the qualified list back up to twenty-five percent, the jury
administrator decides to send more questionnaires to African-American
residents-to oversample the names of African-American residents on
sensitive cases so as to diminish both the appearance and the actuality of bias").
In an ABA-sponsored Gallup telephone survey of 401 state and federal judges taken in
June of 1993, 15% said a judge should always "take into account the racial makeup of the
community in change-of-venue trials," 13% said it should be "a factor 'most of the time'," and
31% said it should" 'rarely' be taken into account." Hengstler, supra note 208, at 71 (emphasis added).
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the source list. Assume also that had Diver City used a random selection
method, so that each person on the source list, including Mr. Doe and
Ms. Smith, could probably expect a jury questionnaire every five years.
Under the race-conscious system, whites are mailed jury questionnaires
less frequently than African Americans. Mr. Doe will be sent a questionnaire more often-say once every three or four years-while Ms. Smith
will receive a questionnaire less often-say once every five or six years.
From their perspectives, they may know that some African Americans
receive jury questionnaires more often than some whites, but neither is
being excluded from a particular trial, or a particular venire, because of
race. Once the questionnaires are sent, the remainder of the selection
process is random or race-neutral.
Compare these effects to the experiences Mr. Doe and Ms. Smith
would have if the jury selectors of Diver City sorted prospective jurors by
race later in the process. If both were summoned but then learned that
Ms. Smith was not chosen for a particular venire because she was white,
each might come away from the experience even more convinced that
juror race matters to the outcome of jury decisions. And if Mr. Doe's or
Ms. Smith's race played a role in determining his or her opportunity to
sit on a jury that will consider known charges against known litigants,
the selection process may teach them that a jury which is too homogeneous would be unfair in that particular type of case.
In sum, even assuming that citizens were fully informed of the extent to which race is used in selecting juries, they would be more likely to
accept last-resort race-conscious procedures early in the selection process-such as stratified questionnaire techniques or the consideration of
race in venue selection-than to accept racial sorting of veniremembers.
Early stage procedures are more easily perceived as efforts to offer an
equal opportunity for all residents of a community to serve as jurors and
to improve the appearance of fairness of the jury system as a whole,
rather than efforts to provide more favorable juries to particular litigants
at the expense of particular jury-eligible citizens.
Finally, any assessment of the degree to which a court's particular
use of race in the jury selection process increases distrust of jury proceedings must consider the identity of the group disadvantaged by the policy.
Socioeconomic realities assure that, for now, attempts to "balance" jury
pools will inevitably involve efforts to increase the jury service opportunities of minorities and reduce existing opportunities for whites. A
proposal that has the opposite effect, that of decreasing existing opportunities for minorities to serve as jurors and increasing those of whites, will
be perceived more negatively. There is a palpable difference between race
discrimination that perpetuates a disadvantage that American citizens
have struggled for decades to surmount and discrimination that lacks
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this tragic tradition. 236 Even though this distinction has not impressed
the Court as an appropriate dividing line between those uses of race
which deserve strict scrutiny and those which do not, it can at least serve
as one factor informing a judge's assessment of the effect of race-con237
scious selection practices on the appearance of fairness.
A related point deserves attention here. One might object that
group preferences in jury selection can never be narrowly tailored to the
goal of maximizing the appearance of fairness if they are limited to members of only one race, or even to members of only racial groups. Underrepresentation of other groups on juries might promote resentment and
distrust as well. If fairness or its appearance requires the presence of
peers of both the victim and the defendant, for instance, then race-conscious selection policies that provide only proportional representation of
one or two targeted groups will be underinclusive at least part of the
time. Many have argued that the impossibility of fashioning a jury that
represents all potentially salient groups-not just racial, ethnic, and gender, but also sexual-preference, religious, etc.-is a reason for refusing to
extend the cross-section right to trial juries. 238 In my view, the same
impracticality should also furnish a defense to the charge that these raceconscious policies do not go far enough. The imperfect accomplishments
of race-conscious jury selection techniques should not prove fatal unless
something better could be devised; reformers should be able to tackle
236 For example, as one group of commentators has explained:
While the Supreme Court has stated that all governmental uses of race are subject to
strict scrutiny, nearly all members of the Supreme Court have recognized that there is a
critical moral and constitutional difference between governmental interests in employing
race to correct historic discrimination-or even to promote diversity-and governmental interests in using race to advance debilitating stereotypes and the perpetuation of
racial exclusion.
Joint Statement of 30 Constitutional Scholars, 98 Yale L.J. 1711, 1712-13 (1989).
237 1 recognize that these predictions about public reaction to various aspects of the jury
system are my own hypotheses, as yet untested. The Court also failed to cite empirical support
when it predicted in Shaw that the use of race in voter redistricting threatens public confidence
in the governmental bodies forming and formed by those districts, as well as deepens racial
divides. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 612-13 (noting that Court's description
of legitimacy in Shaw seemed "rather thin" and suggesting that Court could have been wrong
about effects of redistricting decision in that case). Gathering empirical support on these issues
will be a challenge for anyone litigating the validity of race-conscious voter redistricting or jury
selection decisions after Shaw, and I hope that one of the by-products of the decision will be
more research testing the rhetoric about the effects of race-based decisions on perceptions of
fairness.
238 See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (failing
to find limiting principle to make fair-cross-section requirement workable in practice); James J.
Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 269, 296 (1988) ("IT]he
cross-section requirement and the nondiscrimination principle, regardless of theoretical merit,
are doomed in practice.").
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injustice a piece at a time.239
Whether any of the particular policies canvassed earlier would survive the analysis proposed in this Article would of course depend on the
surrounding circumstances, including an assessment of whether race-

neutral reforms or less intrusive race-conscious reforms were feasible.
Those willing to adopt race-conscious proposals should thoroughly document existing underrepresentation and its causes, investigate race-neutral
procedures to reduce racial disparity, and then, if race-neutral procedures would continue to generate unrepresentative jury pools, prefer
early, rather than late-stage, race-conscious methods of increasing

representation. 24

CONCLUSION

Jury discrimination litigation is not winding down. 24 1 It has been
239 Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485 (1980). Responding to a similar claim of
underinclusiveness, the Court asserted:
There has been no showing in this case that Congress has inadvertently affected an invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that
has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater
than that suffered by the groups encompassed by the [race-conscious]program.
Id. (emphasis added).
240 These tasks are daunting to most court systems. Courts and legislatures are reluctant to
collect and document jury underrepresentation for fear that the statistics will be used by defendants to challenge convictions. Of the states that have adopted the jury selection procedures
proposed by the ABA, two have rejected the recommendation to monitor the representation of
groups injury pools. See ABA Jury Standards, supra note 26, at xviii (Standard 12: Monitoring the Jury System) ("Courts should collect and analyze information regarding the performance of the jury system on a regular basis in order to ensure.., the representativeness and
inclusiveness of the jury source list .... "); Letter from G. Thomas Munsterman, supra note
173; Telephone Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies,
National Center for State Courts (June 9, 1993) (characterizing response of most court personnel to this recommendation as "Why should we do something that can only hurt us?"); cf.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 652-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that employers are trapped between liability to minorities for failing to remedy apparent discrimination and liability to nonminorities for premature affirmative action).
An alternative method of insulating race-conscious methods ofjury selection from constitutional attack might be to seek explicit authorization for these proposals from Congress. See
Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 478 (upholding federal set-aside laws as valid use of Congress's power
under § 5 of fourteenth amendment). For a description of one federal act that would have
regulated state jury selection systems, see William K. Hayes, Note, Jury Selection and the
Equal Protection Clause, 2 U.C.L.A.-Alaska L. Rev. 141, 154-56 (1973). But see Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993) (stating that Court leaves open possibility that § 2 of
Voting Rights Act itself is unconstitutional to extent that it requires adoption of racially gerrymandered districts); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.10, at
658-59 (4th ed. 1991) ("It is doubtful that even a federal law establishing an affirmative action
racial classification would be upheld if the law used a racial quota system, which fixed the
share of benefits that would be allocated to different groups of persons by race.").
241 Some have optimistically claimed that it is. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel & Gary P.
Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial 33-34 (2d ed. 1977).
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transformed. Formerly, minority litigants protested the exclusion of minority jurors. Now every defendant and every affected white citizen is a
potential opponent of measures adopted to ensure minority representation on juries and in jury pools. 24 2 Jury selection litigation is poised to
experience the same shift of focus that other race-discrimination litigation experienced over the last twenty-five years.243 Courts that were once
enlisted to strike down classifications that limit the opportunities of African Americans and other historically disadvantaged groups will be asked
with increasing frequency to strike down affirmative action efforts that
impair, even marginally, existing opportunities for whites to serve on
criminal juries.
If applied inflexibly to the jury context, the Court's most recent
equal protection rhetoric may have the fortunate effect of prompting jury
administrators to opt for more inclusive, race-neutral methods of increasing racial representation on criminal juries. But it may in the process
also discourage laudable race-conscious reforms. Any evaluation of jury
selection practices that are race-conscious must recognize the importance
of race to the public's perceptions of the fairness of jury proceedings.
The Court's latest opinions suggest that a majority of Justices may be
losing this appreciation; I suggest they reconsider. A century of incremental reform has begun to reduce racial underrepresentation on criminal juries and its destructive consequences. This is no time to turn back.
242 See, e.g., Matthew Kauffmann, Death Row Inmate Says Jury Selection Flawed, Hartford Courant, Dec. 3, 1993, at C1 (noting African-American defendant who challenged his
conviction, claiming that judge's effort to include more African Americans in jury pool was
illegal).
243 See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, The Constitution and Race 177 (1992) (referring to present
anomaly of Court's approach noting that "the harshest standard of review, for practical purposes, has been reserved primarily for constitutional claims by the dominant racial group" and
that "[a]nalytical standards introduced to repair process defect thus may be responsible for its
aggravation"); cf. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note *, at 638 (stating that Court has left us
with "the gnawing impression that the rules of the game were changed only when minorities
started to figure out how to play").
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